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The Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant in this case is the State of Idaho, Idaho
Transportation Board, as the governing body of the Idaho Transportation Department
(hereinafter "ITD"). Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent is commercial real estate
developer, HJ Grathol, a California partnership ("Grathol").
ITD now files its "Brief of Respondent." This brief also serves as ITD's "Opening Brief
of Cross-Appellant" in its cross appeal of elements of the District Court's decision on attorney
fees.
I.

INTRODUCTION

ITD filed this action to condemn 16.314 acres of a 56.8-acre parcel of real property
owned by Grathol in Kootenai County, Idaho. A portion of the Grathol property is needed for
construction of the ITD project to widen and improve U.S. Highway 95 ("US-95") from a twolane highway to a four-lane divided highway between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in
north Idaho ("the Project").
In this case, Grathol attempted to tum the condemnation of a portion of its property into
the equivalent of winning the state lottery. Grathol bought the entire 56.8-acre parcel for
$1,450,000.00 in May of 2008. The real estate market then went down, dramatically, from May
of2008 to November 17, 2010, the date of taking in this case. Yet Grathol made demands and
sought to recover as much as $7,369,500 for the taking of only 16.314 acres (less than a third) of
the 56.8-acre parcel it bought for $1,450,000. See R. Ex. 156 at 715-16 (Grathol 's Third
Supplemental Answers and Responses to Discovery). At trial, Grathol sought as much as
$3,093,360. R. Ex. J at 962-63 (Just Compensation).
Grathol 's outlandish demands for compensation had no support from market data and no
connection with fair market value. Having no market support for its demands, Grathol resorted
to (i) improper appraisal methods; (ii) claims for damages barred by law; (iii) constantly
- 1-

changing the rationale and basis of its demands; (iv) refusing to provide expert disclosures; and
(v) presenting expert opinions that had no foundation, no decipherable explanation, and were
incapable of independent evaluation or verification.
After a five-day bench trial, the District Court awarded Grathol just compensation in the
amount of $675,000 for the taking. See R. 1265 at 1297 (Post Trial Memorandum Decision And
Order For Judgment (filed May 24, 2012)). The District Court's decision was amply supported
by the facts, testimony, and exhibits in the record, and fully complied with Idaho law.
II.

SUMMARY OF ITD'S BRIEF

Grathol's appeal has no merit and should be denied for the following reasons.
A.

Threshold Bars To Grathol's Appeal.

First, Grathol did not establish or make any meaningful attempt to establish any errors of
law by the District Court.
Second, Grathol has brought this appeal because it disagrees with the District Court's
findings of fact and the Court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses called at trial. This
is not a proper or sustainable basis for an appeal.
Third, although Grathol implies otherwise, the District Court did not bar any of Grathol 's
witnesses from testifying on any subject or issue, except claims for compensation or damages
based on Sylvan Road, which were dismissed multiple times before trial.
B.

Determination Of The "Larger Parcel" Is A Question Of Fact And All Of
The Evidence Supported The District Court's Decision.

It is well established that identification of the "larger parcel" in condemnation cases is a
question of fact. Idaho law and the testimony of real estate appraisers on both sides established
that the three tests for identifying the larger parcel are unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity.
All witnesses ab:rreed that the 56.8-acre Grathol property has unity of title and is all contiguous.
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Four valuation witnesses testified at trial: real estate appraisers Stan Moe and Larry
Pynes for ITO, and real estate appraiser Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, and part-owner of Grathol,
Alan Johnson, for Grathol. Three of the four valuation witnesses, Moe, Pynes, and Johnson
testified that the 56.8-acre Grathol property had unity of use and would all be used for
commercial development. Johnson made clear that Grathol, and its parent company, Hughes
Investments, do nothing but commercial development. Throughout the case, no representative of
Grathol even suggested that the Grathol property would be put to anything but commercial use.
Only Sherwood thought otherwise. In his appraisal report, he speculated that part of the
eastern portion of the Grathol property "might" be used for self-storage, residential, or light
industrial. However, Grathol had the entire property rezoned commercial immediately after
buying it. Self-storage is a commercial use in the Kootenai County zoning ordinance.
Residential use is prohibited in a commercial zone except for the upper floors of a commercial
building. Industrial, manufacturing, and processing uses are prohibited in a commercial zone
unless part of a commercial use. See Kootenai County Ord. No. 401, Ch. 9, §§ 9-9-4(H), (I), &

9-9-7(8) (attached as Appendix A).
No one from Grathol testified that it planned or even contemplated re-rezoning the land
to residential or industrial use. On the contrary, Grathol repeatedly stressed that Hughes
Investments and its individual project-based partnerships, like Grathol, are engaged only in
commercial development. Therefore, Sherwood's speculation had no basis in fact. It was also
barred by Kootenai County's zoning ordinances.
In short, all of the factual testimony and evidence presented at trial was that the Grathol
property had "unity of use," and that its use was for commercial development. The only thing
offered to the contrary was an opinion by Sherwood that had no factual support and violated the
zoning designation for the property.
-3-

Sherwood also testified to his belief that commercial developments and/or commercial
tenants never bought or used parcels larger than 30 acres. Based on that belief, and nothing
more, he created an art(ficial or hypothetical subdivision of the Grathol property, consisting of
30 acres, which he declared to be the "larger parcel" for purposes of determining the before and
after value of the condemned property.
Sherwood did nothing to support his belief of a 30-acre maximum for commercial
development or commercial tenants. He did not conduct any market-based analysis, study, or
compilation of market data. Other than his personal belief, he stated that he "talked to a couple
of brokers" in his office. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 496:14-20.
Other than Sherwood's personal belief, all of the evidence and testimony at trial refuted
his opinion of the 30-acre maximum. His opinion was refuted by (i) Grathol' s purchase of 56.8
acres for commercial development; (ii) the "comparable sales" selected by Sherwood for his
appraisal ranged in size from 9 to 235 acres; (iii) in one of his comparable sales, Cabela's alone
used 40 acres; (iv) Grathol's own site plans show construction of commercial development on
more than 30 acres of its property; and (v) uniform and uncontested testimony at trial showed

that Grathol would need all of the property for its planned mixed-use commercial development
consisting of a "major tenant," plus two motels, a travel plaza, a number of pad sites for
restaurants and other uses, plus parking, mandatory open areas, landscaping, storm drainage
areas, waste water treatment facilities, and "land application" of the commercial development's
treated waste water.
In short, all evidence at trial demonstrated that the 16.314 acres condemned by ITD was
part of the "larger parcel" owned by Grathol. That larger parcel had unity of title, unity of use,
and was contiguous. The only thing on the other side of the scale was the unsupported opinion
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of Sherwood, which had no basis in fact and was squarely refuted throughout the trial and the
testimony of every other witness.
C.

Severance Damages.

Grathol argues that the District Court erred in determining that the Grathol property
suffered no severance damages as a result of the US-95 Project. Grathol Br. at 3 7-41.
According to Grathol, the District Court failed to consider the testimony of Grathol' s architect
and site planner, Geoff Reeslund, regarding potential increased costs to connect utilities and
sewer to the western-most remainder of the Grathol property. Id. To try to bolster its argument,
Grathol claims that ITD's rebuttal expert, George Hedley, also testified that development costs
would increase as a result of the US-95 Project. However, Hedley actually testified that overall
development costs would be significantly lower after the US-95 Project.
Grathol's argument regarding severance damages fails for several reasons. First, no
testimony by either Reeslund or Hedley would support an independent award of severance
damages under controlling eminent domain principles. As agreed by Grathol and ordered by the
District Court, the long-standing rule in eminent domain proceedings is that severance damages
are measured by the difference, if any, between the fair market value of the remainder property
before and after the taking. Thus, an award of severance damages based on an alleged increase
in development costs is improper, particularly where neither Reeslund nor Hedley testified about
the fair market value of the Grathol property or any decrease in fair market value for any reason.
Second, Grathol's argument that the District Court failed to consider Reeslund's
testimony is contrary to the record. Grathol agreed, prior to trial, that all testimony regarding
impacts on the remainder property were incorporated into Johnson's testimony regarding the
before and after value of the remainder property, and no separate or discrete items of severance
damages were being sought. Thus, to the extent that Reeslund's testimony had any bearing on
-5-

severance damages, it was considered by the District Court in its analysis of Johnson's valuation
testimony. Further, in its consideration and analysis of Johnson's testimony, the District Court
soundly rejected Johnson's valuation conclusions, including his claim of severance damages as
"unpersuasive," "confusing" and "contradictory at best." R. 1293 (Post Trial Memorandum
Decision and Order for Judgment).
Third, Gratho l's claim for a separate award of severance damages based on Reeslund and
Hedley's testimony is being made for the first time on appeal and is therefore barred by law. This
Court has repeatedly held that issues or claims raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered. Therefore, Grathol's newly-asserted claim for severance damages in the amount of
an alleged increase in costs for a future development is improper and barred by law.
The District Court's determination that there were no severance damages was proper and
more than amply supported by the evidence in the record, and should be affirmed on appeal.
D.

Sylvan Road.

ITD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road and is not constructing Sylvan Road on the
Grathol Property. Therefore, the District Court repeatedly dismissed claims by Grathol for
compensation and/or severance damages based on Sylvan Road. Grathol filed an interlocutory
appeal of the District Court's first ruling on that issue, and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding
that ITD is not taking land for or constructing Sylvan Road on the Grathol property. See State of
Idaho, Dep't ofTransp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 93,278 P.3d 957,963 (2012) ("Grathol I").
Despite these rulings, Grathol' s experts continued to allude to impacts of Sylvan Road,
which ITD has nothing to do with, as a means of establishing severance damages. However,
Grathol never disclosed any specific severance damage claim and did not attribute any specific
damages to Sylvan Road prior to trial. Sherwood, Grathol's appraiser, did not attribute any
damages to Sylvan Road. Johnson, part owner of Grathol, wanted to testify about the "impact"
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of Sylvan Road, but he had no specific damages to testify to and had not disclosed any alleged
"damage" figure prior to trial. See Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 801-03.
Grathol agreed and the District Court ordered that severance damages in this case, like all
other Idaho condemnation cases, would be measured by the difference, if any, in the fair market
value of the remaining property before and after the taking. Johnson testified fully on that
subject. However, when Johnson attempted to present vague testimony of an alleged adverse
"impact" of Sylvan Road, the District Court properly excluded that testimony. Grathol has no
legal or factual basis to contest that evidentiary ruling.

E.

Summary Of ITD's Cross-Appeal On Attorney Fees.

The District Court incorrectly applied Idaho Code § 12-117 to ITD's motion for attorney
fees, and denied ITD's motion under the incorrect standard set by§ 12-117. Idaho Code§ 7718, not§ 12-117, applies to the award of costs and attorney fees in condemnation cases.
Section 12-117 is a general statute governing attorney fee disputes involving
governmental entities. However, the Idaho Legislature has adopted a specific statute, Idaho
Code § 7-718, to govern the award of attorney fees and cost awards in condemnation cases. It is
well settled that the specific statute controls over the more general. Ada County Highway Dist. v.

Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 876-77, 673 P.2d 1067, 1069-70 (1983); Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho
155,162,267 P.3d 1270, 1277 (2012).
The District Court erred in applying§ 12-117 instead of§ 7-718. Having failed to apply
the correct statute, the District Court's ruling on ITD's motion for attorney fees must be
reversed.
Under Idaho Code § 7-718, costs may be awarded to both condemnors and condemnees,
and "costs" authorized under the statute includes attorney fees. See Acarrequi, l 05 Idaho at 87677, 673 P.2d at 1069-70. The Idaho Supreme Court held in Acarrequi that a condemnor can
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recover attorney fees in the exceptional case. Id. at 877-78, 673 P .2d at 1071-72. The present
case is the exceptional case because of the many outrageous demands by Grathol and its
seemingly endless abuses of the District Court's orders, the rules of civil procedure, discovery
requirements, and valuation standards and methodologies applied in condemnation cases.
Grathol' s abuses and improper tactics included:
•

Opposing ITD's motion for possession on meritless grounds;

•

Repeatedly failing and refusing to answer discovery;

•

Repeatedly failing and refusing to disclose expert opinions;

•

Hiding expert opinions behind an inapplicable and improper assertion of the
federal "actor-viewer" exception;

•

Making repeated and continuing demands for compensation based on an alleged
taking for Sylvan Road-despite having no factual basis for the claims and
despite repeated rulings from the Court denying and dismissing the claims;

•

Presenting improper valuations that had no "before and after" analysis, no
understandable explanation, and numerous violations oflaw and deviations from
accepted appraisal standards;

•

Making claims for damages that were clearly barred by Idaho law and dropping
the claims only after forcing ITD to engage in expensive briefing and preparation
for oral argument on a motion for summary judgment to dismiss these claims; and

•

Making outlandish demands for compensation that were not supported by the
market, had no relation to "fair market value," and were soundly rejected by the
Court.

Grathol also engaged in a series of flagrant abuses of valuation methodologies and
Idaho's laws governing the determination of just compensation in condemnation cases. These
abuses created an immense amount of unnecessary litigation and expense over issues barred by
law or wholly unsupported by the facts in the case. The abuses included:
•

Failure to use the date of taking as the date of value, as required by Idaho statute;

•

The use of multiple dates of value, in violation of statute;

•

Failure to do a "before and after" analysis of the value of the property;

•

Failure to use the entire Grathol property as the "larger parcel" for purposes of
determining the "before and after" value;
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•

Using sales as alleged "comparable sales" that were in far superior locations, with
substantially greater demand for commercial development, and substantially
better situated for the installation of utilities or with utilities already installed;

•

Sherwood's use of a negotiated settlement of a condemnation as one of his
primary "comparable sales," despite his testimony that such a transaction is not an
indication of "market value";

•

Failure to identify, quantify, or explain any of the adjustments they made to sales
as part of the "comparable sales approach" to real estate appraisal;

•

Producing only a limited, restricted appraisal report that expressly noted that third
parties would have difficulty understanding the report;

•

Repeatedly changing valuation conclusions and the explanations for the
conclusions reached;

•

Continuing to assert claims for compensation based on the time needed for
construction of the US-95 Project (i.e., "construction delay"), despite an order
from the Court barring such claims; and

•

Johnson basing his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical
development were completed-an approach that was barred by law.

Based on the foregoing, if this case is not the "exceptional" case where the condernnor
should recover reasonable attorney fees, as held by the Court in Acarrequi, then no exceptional
case exists. Accordingly, landowners will have license to engage in these abuses and improper
tactics with impunity. The law must provide a remedy under these circumstances.
In addition to the above, ITD was clearly the prevailing party in this case. Grathol sought
as much as $7 million, and the award of just compensation by the District Court was $675,000.
ITD made a timely settlement offer of $1.1 million prior to trial in accordance with Acarrequi
and its progeny.
Since ITD was clearly the prevailing party, the District Court properly awarded ITD its
costs as a matter of right. The Court also awarded ITD discretionary costs of $11,000, which
represented the appraisal and testimony fees of ITD expert Larry Pynes. Given the wide
disparity of values between the appraisal ofITD's expert Stan Moe and Grathol's valuation
witnesses Sherwood and Johnson, another appraisal was clearly needed. In addition, the District
Court relied heavily on the Pynes appraisal and found it to be the most accurate and reliable of
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all of the expert valuations. Accordingly, the District Court's award of these discretionary costs
was warranted and appropriate.

III.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the District Court's ruling that the "larger parcel" is the 56.8 acre parcel owned by
Grathol violate Idaho law?

2.

Is the District Court's ruling that the "larger parcel" is the 56.8 acre parcel owned by
Grathol supported by the facts?

3.

Did the District Court make any error oflaw in finding that the remaining Grathol
property suffered no severance damages?

4.

Is the District Court's finding of no severance damages supported by the facts?

5.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding testimony by Grathol attempting
to recover compensation based on Sylvan Road?

6.

Did the District Court error as a matter oflaw in awarding costs as a matter of right and
discretionary costs to ITD?

IV.

ISSUES ON ITO'S CROSS APPEAL

1.

Did the District Court err in holding that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive statutory
basis for awarding attorney fees in condemnation cases?

2.

After finding ITD to be the prevailing party in this suit, did the District Court err in
failing to award reasonable attorney fees to ITD?

V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF BENCH TRIAL

"Appellate review of the district court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the
evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions
of law." Nampa & Meridian Irrig. Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518,521, 20 P.3d
702, 705 (2001) (citation omitted). "A district Court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be
liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district court's role
as trier of fact." Id. "It is the province of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses." Id. Thus, "where
the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, those
findings will not be overturned on appeal." Id. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "evidence
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which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F.
Afagnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 761, 992 P.2d 751, 756 (1999) (citation omitted).

The determination of the "larger parcel" in condemnation cases is a question of fact. "If,
as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract held by the same owner, it is error to
consider such parcel as if it constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in
the possession of the same owner[.]" State ex. rel. Symms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho
528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972) (citation omitted).
The appellate Court exercises free review of the lower Court's conclusions oflaw "to
determine whether the Court correctly stated the applicable law and whether the legal
conclusions are sustained by the facts found." Nampa & Meridian Irrig. Dist., 135 Idaho at 521,
20 P.3d at 705.

VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The ITD Project.

1.

The Idaho Transportation Department is engaged in a project to widen and

improve a section ofUS-95 between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the
Project").
2.

The US-95 Project is in District 1 of the Idaho Transportation Department. Jason

Minzghor is the District 1 Project Development Engineer for ITD. As the District 1 Project
Development Engineer, he has primary responsibility for managing and administering the US-95
Project. Grathol I, R. at 157, ,i,i 2-3 (Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of Motion for
Order Granting Possession of Real Property). 1

The record on appeal includes the record from the first appeal in this case. Supreme Court Case
No. 38511-2011. For ease ofreference, citations to the record from the first appeal will be
referred to as "Grathol I, R."
1
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3.

At trial, Minzghor explained the background and purposes of the US-95 Project,

the portion of the Grathol property needed for the Project, and the legal descriptions and acreages
of the taking and the remainder of the Grathol property. Trial Tr., Vol. I at 49-60. He also
submitted a detailed affidavit regarding the Project and taking on January 18, 2011. Grathol I, R.
at 156 to 160.
4.

The following is a summary of the affidavit and trial testimony ofMinzghor. See

5.

US-95 is the key north-south link for northern Idaho transportation, commerce,

id.

and tourism. In the area of the Project, US-95 is currently a two-lane highway. Rapid growth in
Bonner and Kootenai Counties has caused traffic volumes to increase substantially, in tum
causing traffic congestion and reduced public safety. The purpose of the Project is to improve
safety and increase the capacity of US-95.
6.

In 2002, ITD initiated a comprehensive study ofUS-95 between Garwood and

Sagle. The study determined that US-95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public
safety and enable the highway to accommodate increasing traffic volumes. This process
involved extensive work with the public, local governmental entities, and state and federal
agencies.
7.

The study culminated in a decision by the Idaho Transportation Board to upgrade

31.5 miles of US-95 to a four-lane divided freeway with interchange access only.
8.

Due to the size of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into

seven segments. The Grathol property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, ITD
Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1.8 miles
of US-95 from a two-lane, unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and access-
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controlled highway. The Athol Segment will also construct an interchange with State Highway
54 just outside the town of Athol.
9.

In order to construct the Project, ITD must take and condemn a portion of the

Grathol property. This is a partial taking case.
10.

ITD filed this action on November 17, 2010 and summons was issued on that

date. Therefore, under Idaho Code § 7-712, the date of taking and the date of valuation in this
case are November 17, 2010.
B.

The Grathol Property And The Taking.

11.

The Grathol property is located in Kootenai County, outside the town of Athol, at

the northeast comer of present US-95 and Highway 54.
12.

The Grathol property is bounded by US-95 on the west, State Highway 54 on the

south, Howard Road on the east, and the Farragut Trail on the north.
13.

The Grathol property is bare, undeveloped land, except for an old, vacant building

on the southwest comer of the property.
14.

Before the Project, the total area of the Grathol property was 56.81 acres. The

property condemned, shown in Exhibit B to the Complaint (Grathol I, R. 1 at 11 ), is 16.314
acres, leaving Grathol with 40.496 acres after the taking.
15.

A small but contiguous parcel of 0.4 acres is located at the southwest comer of the

property. Some appraisers included the 0.4 acres in the "larger parcel" and in the valuation
appraisal, others did not. All agreed, however, that whether the 0.4 acres was included or not
had no bearing on the issue of just compensation. Accordingly, for ease of discussion, this brief
will refer to the entire Grathol property, the "larger parcel," as 56.8 acres.
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16.

Upon completion of the US-95 Project, a small portion of the Grathol property

will continue to have frontage on the former US-95. The remaining property will be adjacent to
the new interchange with State Highway 54, at the northeast quadrant of the interchange.
17.

Below, on the left, is an overhead aerial photograph of the Grathol property with

the property lines set forth in red (based on R. Ex.166-3 ). The photograph on the right shows the
Grathol property, the area of the take, and the "remainder" Grathol property after the take (based
on R. Ex. 166-4).

I

•

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

C.

Grathol's Purchase Of The Property On May 28, 2008.

18.

Grathol first became interested in the property in early 2008. Trial Tr., Vol. II at

358. At that time, the property was for sale, and the listing for the property by the Multiple
Listing Service gave notice to prospective purchasers that a portion of the property would be
needed for the US-95 Project. R. Ex. 16 (Grathol Property Listing). The MLS listing also
advised that an interested buyer should "check with [the] Department of Transportation to
verify" the details regarding the Project. Id.
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19.

Grathol purchased the 56.8 acre parcel on May 28, 2008 for the sum of

$1,450,000. R. Ex. 26 (Buyer's Settlement Statement).
20.

At trial, Grathol' s appraiser, Sherwood, stated that he believed the seller was in

financial distress when he sold the property to Grathol. However, he did not confirm this with
the seller. Stan Moe, testifying for ITD, stated that he spoke personally with the seller, who
informed Moe that he was not in financial distress at the time of the sale. Trial Tr., Vol. I at 120123. The seller infonned Moe that he got the price he wanted for the property, and had it listed
at that price for over a year before receiving an offer. Id. at 123 & 126. Mr. Moe also testified
that he reviewed and relied on an affidavit from the seller attesting to the fact that the sale was
not made under financial distress. Id. at 124-27. Therefore, the May 28, 2008 sale of the subject
property for $1,450,000 was highly indicative of the fair market value of the property at that
time. Moreover, the testimony at trial was uniform among all witnesses that the real estate
market only went down after 2008.
D.

Grathol Rezoned The Property From Rural To Commercial.

21.

Grathol's part-owner, Alan Johnson, and its architect and site planner, Geoff

Reeslund, both testified that Grathol purchased the property for mixed-use commercial
development. See, e.g., R. Ex. 156 at 712 (Grathol's Third Supplemental Answers and
Responses to Discovery) ("Hughes Investments [the parent of the Grathol partnership] purchased
this property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it into a commercial retail center/hospitality
project.").
22.

No testimony was offered by any owner or employee of Grathol that any portion

of the property would be developed with anything other than commercial development.
23.

Before purchasing the property, Grathol started work on an application to

Kootenai County to change the zoning of the property from Rural to Commercial. Grathol
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purchased the property on May 28, 2008, and submitted its rezone application to Kootenai
County on May 30, 2008. R. Ex. 130 at 429-39 (Zone Change Application).
24.

Grathol's rezone application referred to the US-95 Project and cited the Project as

one of the reasons why a zoning change to Commercial was warranted for the property. Id. The
application stated that "I-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be
realigned to cross this property, providing on and off-ramps at the Hwy 54 intersection." Id. at
431.
25.

On November 20, 2008, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued an

Order of Decision granting Grathol's requested zoning change, and ordered that the entire
Grathol property be rezoned from Rural to Commercial. R. Ex. 135 (Order of Decision).
26.

Grathol' s witnesses testified that the taking of a portion of the property has not

deterred Grathol from proceeding with its commercial development. See, e.g., Trial Tr., Vol. III
at 451-52 (testimony of GeoffReeslund, Grathol architect and site planner).

ARGUMENT ON GRA THOL APPEAL
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 56.8-ACRE
PARCEL OWNED BY GRATHOL IS THE "LARGER PARCEL," A PORTION
OF WHICH HAS BEEN CONDEMNED IN THIS PARTIAL TAKING CASE
A.

"Highest and Best Use" and "Larger Parcel."

It is well established in Idaho that real property to be condemned for public use shall be
valued at its "highest and best use," which may or may not be its present use. As held by this
Court,
The highest and best use for which the property is adaptable and
needed or likely needed in the reasonably near future is to be
considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to the full
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market
value of the property.

- 16 -

City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho at 531,493 P.2d at 390. Therefore, appraisers retained by

parties in Idaho condemnation cases analyze and make a detennination of the "highest and best
use" of the subject property.
Similarly, in "partial takings" cases where part, but not all, of the property owner's land
is condemned, the "larger parcel" from which the condemned property is taken must be
identified. To determine whether condemned property is part of a "larger parcel," courts and
appraisers examine whether the condemned and remaining property have (1) unity of ownership;
(2) contiguity; and (3) unity of use. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN at§ 14B.03[1] (2011). See
also City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho at 531, 493 P .2d at 390 (noting the three-part test for

identifying the "larger parcel"). Therefore, appraisers retained in condemnation cases analyze
and make a determination of the "larger parcel" in partial takings case.
The Grathol property is 56.8 acres. It is all contiguous and all owned by Grathol. All
witnesses, including Grathol's appraiser, Sherwood, agreed that the entire 56.8 acres has unity of
title and is contiguous. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 530 (Sherwood testimony).
B.

Grathol Recognizes That The Determination Of The Larger Parcel Is A
Question Of Fact.

In its brief on appeal, Grathol repeatedly recognizes that the determination of the "larger
parcel" is a question of fact. See Grathol Br. at 16 (larger parcel determination "is fundamentally
a factual inquiry"); at 16 (larger parcel "is a flexible concept applied based on the facts"); at 17
(the larger parcel "is a question of fact"); and at 32 ("Idaho case law has always held this is a
factual detennination").
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C.

Sherwood's Appraisal Report Did Not Analyze Or Make A Determination Of
Either The "Highest And Best Use" Or The "Larger Parcel."

Grathol's appraiser, Sherwood, did not do any analysis of "highest and best use" in his
appraisal report. Those words do not even appear in his report. See R. 898-909 (Sherwood
Appraisal Report).
Likewise, Sherwood did not do any analysis of the "larger parcel." The words "larger
parcel" do not appear in his report. Id. He did not do any analysis using the three criteria for
identifying whether the condemned property is part of a larger parcel-unity of use, unity of
title, and contiguity. Id.
At trial, Sherwood did not testify to an opinion of the "highest and best use" of the
Grathol property either in the "before" or "after" condition. He also did not testify to a specific
conclusion as to the "larger parcel" using the three-part test established by Idaho case law and
the appraisal profession.
D.

Rather Than Making A "Larger Parcel" Determination Based On Facts,
Sherwood Created An Artificial "Larger Parcel.

As noted above, the determination of the "larger parcel" is a question of fact. City of
Mountain Home, 94 Idaho at 531, 493 P .2d at 390. Rather than making a determination based on

facts, Sherwood created a hypothetical or artificial 30-acre parcel within the 56.8-acre Grathol
property and used it as the "larger parcel." Although not clearly defined, the 30 acres used by
Sherwood apparently consisted of the westernmost 30 acres of the Grathol property starting
nearest to existing US-95 and extending east to an imaginary line where Sherwood speculated
that Sylvan Road might someday be built, in a straight north-south line across the Grathol
property. The area to the east of this imaginary line contained 26.8 acres of the Grathol property.
Sherwood gave two reasons for the creation and use of a hypothetical 30-acre subdivision
of the Grathol property as the "larger parcel." First, he stated his belief that the largest size of
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commercial developments is 30 acres. "In my experience in looking at the market, in terms of
larger sales of commercial tracts, 30 acres is about the largest that I am aware of in the region."
Trial Tr., Vol. III at 498:5-7. Second, Sherwood testified that he believed his hypothetical 30acre parcel had a "different" use than the eastern 26.8 acres. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 496: 14-20.
However, he did not discuss "highest and best use," and did not testify that his hypothetical
parcel had a different "highest and best use" from the eastern part of the Grathol property.
E.

The Facts Did Not Support Sherwood's Artificial "Larger Parcel," And The
District Court Was Not Persuaded By His Opinion.

The District Court was not persuaded by either of Sherwood's reasons for creating an
artificial 30-acre subdivision of the Grathol property and making it the "larger parcel."
"Sherwood's methodology of creating a larger parcel based on its value to a proposed future
development is factually unpersuasive when considered in light of all the other evidence in the
record." R. 1265 at 1281 (Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment)
(emphasis added).
Grathol has appealed the District Court's finding and conclusion. Grathol states that the
Court's finding "begs the question. What other evidence?" Grathol Br. at 26. The answer is all
of the factual evidence. The only thing to the contrary, offered by anyone, was Sherwood's
opinion.
F.

The First Basis For Sherwood's "Larger Parcel" Opinion-That
Commercial Developments Do Not Exceed 30 Acres-Was Not Supported By
Any Facts, And Was Squarely Refuted Throughout The Trial.

Sherwood testified that it was his belief that commercial developers do not purchase or
develop parcels larger than 30 acres for commercial development. Beyond his personal belief,
he testified that he spoke to "a couple of brokers in the office" who he stated were of like
opinion. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 496:15-19.
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Sherwood offered no factual support for his belief or opinion. He did not do any marketbased study or analysis and did not compile or present any market data to support his personal
belief that commercial real estate developments do not exceed 30 acres.
1.

Sherwood's opinion of a 30-acre maximum is refuted by Gratho/'s
purchase of 56.8 acres for commercial development.

Sherwood's opinion is squarely refuted by the fact that Grathol itself bought this 56.8acre parcel for commercial development. After buying it, Grathol had the entire property
rezoned for commercial development and plans to use all of it for commercial development. See
§ VII(G)(l)(c), infra and citations therein.
2.

Sherwood's 30-acre maximum opinion is refuted by the "comparable
sales" he used in his own appraisal.

Sherwood's theory is refuted by the "comparable sales" he used in his own appraisal,
which consisted of commercial properties ranging in size from 9 acres to 23 5 acres. See R. Ex.
154 at 674-76 (Sherwood restricted appraisal report). His comparable sale No. 2 was 235 acres.
In his discussion of that sale, Sherwood notes that the Cabela store, alone, committed to 40
acres, id. at 674, which refutes any claim that end-users never want anything larger than 30

acres. He goes on to note that a Wal-Mart is also going in at that site, id., which demonstrates
that a mixed use development like the one proposed by Grathol certainly needs more than 30
acres, defeating Sherwood's suggestion that 30 acres is the largest size of commercial
developments.
Here, Grathol has proposed a "major" tenant, plus one to two motels, a travel plaza, and
multiple pad sites for restaurants and other smaller users. See, e.g., R. Ex. Hat 953, 955. In
addition, the record established, in detail, that Grathol' s development will need land for setbacks,
open areas, landscaping, roads, parking lots, storm drainage, waste water treatment facilities, and
land for application of the development's treated waste water. See R. 384 at 503-16 (Report of
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David Evans and Associates); and testimony of George Hedley, Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 732:22734:9. Land application alone will require between 13 and 24 acres of the Grathol property as
part of the planned commercial development. Id. See also Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 697:10-14
(Grathol's own witness, James Coleman, testifying that between 13 and 16 acres ofland would
be needed for land application of the treated waste water from the Grathol commercial
development).
Sherwood's opinion that 30 acres is the universal size for commercial development or
end-users is not reflected in his other comparable sales. Comparable sale No. 1 is 9 acres; No. 2
is 235 acres; No. 3 is 13.5 acres; No. 4 is 50.44 acres; No. 5 is 4.41 acres; No. 6 is 17 acres; No.
7 is 29 acres; No. 8 is 18. 71 acres; No.9 is 18.98 acres; and No. 10 is 22.98 acres. In short, his
selection of a 30-acre parcel is arbitrary and has no basis in market data. He could just as easily
have selected 10 acres, 20 acres, 40 acres, 50 acres, and so on, as shown by his own comparable
sales of commercial property.
3.

Sherwood's opinion that commercial developments do not exceed 30
acres is further refuted by Grathol's own site plans, which show
commercial development on more than Sherwood's hypothetical 30acre parcel.

The site plans prepared by Grathol for both the before condition (without the new
freeway) and the after condition (with the new freeway) show commercial development on the
26.8 acres beyond Sherwood's artificial 30-acre "larger parcel." Below is a "before" site plan
prepared by Grathol (without any change to US-95), which shows commercial development (a
Travel Plaza) east of Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel. Specifically, the eastern edge of
the hypothetical Sherwood parcel is the edge where Sherwood speculated that Sylvan Road
might be built across the Grathol property from State Highway 54 on the south and running due
north (shown by a red line).
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R. Ex.Hat 954 (red line added).
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Below is an "after" site plan prepared by Grathol (with the new US-95), which again
shows commercial development (a Travel Plaza) east of Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel.
Specifically, the eastern edge of the hypothetical Sherwood parcel is where Sherwood speculated
that Sylvan Road might be built across the Grathol property from State Highway 54 on the south
and running due north (shown by a red line).
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At trial, Geoff Reeslund, Grathol's vice president for project development and who
serves as their architect and site planner, testified that Grathol is proceeding with the commercial
development as planned. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 461 :12-18. Reeslund did not testify that Grathol
will not develop the eastern portion with commercial uses. Therefore, Sherwood's larger parcel
determination is refuted by the stated intentions of his own client.
4.

Sherwood's 30-acre maximum opinion is further refuted by the fact
that Grathol's own commercial development needs more than 30
acres.

Sherwood himself testified that Grathol would need part of the eastern 26.8 acres for the
waste water treatment system for development on the western 30 acres. Trial Tr., Vol. III at
534:14-23. He also testified that he believed the waste water treatment facility and land needed
for treated water application would be located on the eastern portion of the property. Id. and
Trial Tr., Vol. III at 534:24-535:21.
Grathol's witness, James Coleman, testified that Grathol would need between 13 and 16
acres ofland for the waste water treatment system and land application of the treated water.
Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 697: 10-14. Coleman speculated that Grathol might be able to pipe its waste
water and put it on someone else's property, but his testimony was only speculation. He did not
testify that anyone had agreed to take Grathol's waste water.
ITD witness George Hedley testified that Grathol would need from 19 to 25 acres for the
waste water treatment system and land application for its treated waste water based on detailed
analyses by senior engineers with David Evans and Associates. Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 726: 11727: l. See also R. 384 at 510-16 (Report of David Evans and Associates). Thus, the expert
report of David Evans and Associates, and the trial testimony of both Grathol witness Coleman
and ITD witness Hedley, established that much more of the Grathol property, above and beyond
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Sherwood's artificial 30-acre parcel, would be needed for the commercial development planned
by Grathol.
In its brief, Grathol suggests that ITD failed to provide evidence to establish that the
western 30 acres needs the eastern 26.8 acres to develop. In Idaho, Grathol has the burden of
proving just compensation. See IDJI2d § 7.03; see also Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, --Idaho---, --- P.3d --- 2012 WL 231254, *5 (Idaho Jan. 26, 2012) ("The burden of proving just
compensation is borne by the landowner.") ( citation omitted). Therefore, Sherwood and Grathol
had the burden of proving his theory that the large mixed-use commercial development planned
by Grathol could be developed exclusively on his hypothetical 30-acre parcel. He certainly
failed to do so since Grathol's own development plans show commercial development on the
eastern portion, and its own witnesses testified that more than 30 acres would be needed for the
development.

5.

Sherwood is the only valuation witness who did not value the entire
Grathol property or "larger parcel."

Of the four valuation witnesses called at trial, Moe and Pynes for ITD, and Sherwood and
Johnson for Grathol, only Sherwood failed to value the entire Grathol property or "larger parcel."

See R. Ex. 12 (Moe Appraisal Report); R. Ex. 139 (Pynes Appraisal Report); and R. 720-29 at
721 (Grathol Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure (filed Feb. 10, 2012)) ("Alan Johnson will
testify that the value of the entire tract before the taking, in his opinion, is between $5,379,660
and $6,359,760.") (emphasis added, footnote omitted). See also R. Ex. J (summary of Johnson's
valuation, showing his valuation used the entire Grathol property, and not just a hypothetical
segment like Sherwood).
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6.

The other appraisers were highly critical of Sherwood's opinion of the
"larger parcel."

The other two real estate appraisers who testified at trial, Stan Moe and Larry Pynes,
were highly critical of Sherwood's opinion of the "larger parcel," including the fact that it
violated the Uniform Standards Of Appraisal Practice ("USP AP"). See Trial Tr., Vol. V at
951:15-958:10; 959:10-13; 959:21-960:20 and 973:4-19 (Moe testimony); Trial Tr., Vol.Vat
859:18-864:25; 897:6-900:18 (Pynes testimony). In addition to all of the factual evidence, this
extensive testimony from two other professional real estate appraisers gave the District Court
ample basis to disagree with Sherwood's opinion of the "larger parcel."
G.

The Second Basis For Sherwood's "Larger Parcel" Opinion-That The
Grathol Property Did Not Have "Unity Of Use"-Was Not Supported By
Any Facts And Was Squarely Refuted Throughout The Trial.
1.

All valuation witnesses, except Sherwood, concluded that the "highest
and best use" of the entire Grathol property is the same: commercial
development.
a)

Real Estate Appraiser Stan Moe.

Stan Moe performed a detailed analysis of the "highest and best use" of the Grathol
property, before and after the taking. He concluded that the "highest and best use" of the entire
property was for future commercial development. See R. Ex. 12 at 63-66 (Appraisal Report,
Columbia Valuation Group, by Stan Moe, MAI) ("highest and best use" before taking), and id. at
80 ("highest and best use" after taking). Moe's findings and conclusions were based on the
definition of "highest and best use" established by the Appraisal Institute. Id. at 63. The
determination is governed by what use is "physically possible, reasonably probable, legally
permissible, and economically feasible." Id. Moe applied those tests to the Grathol property and
reached a formal conclusion based on the characteristics of the Grathol property, the site plans
prepared by Grathol, and their stated intention to construct a commercial development on the
property with or without the US-95 Project.
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At trial, Moe testified at length regarding his analysis and conclusion that the "highest
and best use" of the Grathol property is for commercial development. Trial Tr., Vol. I. at
147:19-149:18; 150:15-151 :24; 160:4-161 :25. Moe did not testify that the Grathol property
might be put to some lesser or lower value use, such as industrial or residential. In fact, such a
finding would have been contrary to Grathol's rezoning of the entire property to commercial.
b)

Real Estate Aappraiser Larry Pynes.

Larry Pynes also performed a detailed analysis of the "highest and best use" of the
Grathol property. Like Moe, he concluded that the "highest and best use" of the entire property
was for future commercial development. See R. Ex. 139 at 534-35 (Appraisal Report, Herron
Companies, by Lawrence R. Pynes, J.S., ASA, SCREA, and Jeffrey M. Key, MAI). Pynes'
findings and conclusions were based on the definition of "highest and best use" within the
Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal. Id. at 534. The definition is governed by what use is
"physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, that results in the highest land
value as of the effective date of the appraisal." Id. Pynes applied those tests to the Grathol
property and reached a formal conclusion based on the characteristics of the Grathol property,
the site plans prepared by Grathol, and their stated intention to construct a commercial
development on the property with or without the new US-95 highway.
Pynes also testified at trial as to his analysis and conclusion that the "highest and best
use" of the entire Grathol property is for commercial development. Trial Tr., Vol. V at 862-72;
929.
c)

Alan Johnson, Part-Owner of Grathol.

In his expert disclosure, Johnson explained that "Hughes Investments and its various
partnerships is a commercial real estate developer [and] not a land speculator." R. Ex. 156 at
711 (Grathol Third Supplemental Responses to ITD's First Set of Discovery). HJ Grathol is a
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California general partnership formed by Hughes Investments for the purpose of purchasing and
constructing a commercial development on the Grathol property at issue. Johnson made clear in
his report that Hughes Investments only does commercial development. "Since the company was
fonned in 1977, Hughes Investments entities have acquired, entitled, developed, constructed,
leased and managed over 5,000,000 square feet of GLA." Id. (GLA is "gross leasable area" for
commercial uses). Johnson also stated that "Hughes Investments and its entities have and always
will make our income from developing property," and said that they were "highly experienced
commercial developers." Id. at 711-12.
In his expert disclosure, Johnson further stated:
With respect to the property at the northeast comer of
Highways 95 and 54, in Athol Idaho [the property at issue in this
case], Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with
the sole intent to develop it into a commercial retail
center/hospitality project. Hughes Investments acquired and
immediately rezoned the [entire] property to a commercial
designation, invested in engineering a sewage treatment system
that would be approved by the Idaho DEQ, commenced
discussions with merchants and tenants for prospective sales or
leases, met with and filed site plans with Kootenai County and
commissioned the prerequisite traffic study for further
development evaluation.

Id. at 712 (emphasis and brackets added). He added: "Hughes Investments has a long history of
successfully developing retail shopping centers. Hughes Investments has been designing,
building and leasing shopping centers for near Iy forty years." Id. at 712-13.
At trial, Johnson made clear that Grathol intends to use the entire property for
commercial development.
Q.

And from your experience and your knowledge of
commercial retail development property, is that a positive
locale?

A.

It's a 100 percent site. They do not get any better than that.
*

*
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*

A.

We do not, never have, never will, buy a piece o_fproperty
that we do not intend to develop.

Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 759:21-25; 764:13-14.
Johnson, an owner of Grathol, never testified that any portion of the Grathol property
would be developed with non-commercial uses. He testified that the western portion of the
property closest to US-95 would most likely be where commercial retail uses would be located.
Id. at 805:14-15. However, he never testified, or even implied, that any portion of the Grathol

property would be developed with non-commercial uses, such as residential or industrial. As
previously noted, no evidence was offered or admitted that Hughes Investments/Grathol does
anything but commercial development, or that any portion of the Grathol property would be
developed with non-commercial uses.
d)

Sherwood was the only witness who speculated that a portion
of the Grathol property might be put to a "different" use.

Unlike the other appraisers in the case, Sherwood did not perform a "highest and best
use" analysis for either his hypothetical 30-acre "larger parcel," or any other part of the Grathol
property. His appraisal report, (R. Ex. 154 at 668-79), does not even use the term "highest and
best use," and does not contain any "highest and best use" analysis or make any conclusion.
In his report, Sherwood speculates that "[t]he balance of the site [the 26.8 acres east of
his artificial 30-acre subparcel of the Grathol property] might include some self storage,
residential uses, or perhaps some type oflight industrial use." Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
However, at trial, Sherwood did not even engage in that speculation. Rather, he limited his
testimony to saying that the 26.8 acres might have a d[fferent use (Trial Tr., Vol. III at 496: 1519; 497:7-10), without specifying what that use might be or whether that use might be
commercial but just not retail commercial. He also did not testify that the eastern 26.8 acres has
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a different "highest and best use," or that Grathol intends to "re-rezone" the property to some
other use such as industrial or residential.
As to his speculation of the "different" uses to which the Grathol property might be put,
the stated uses are either commercial uses and therefore not a "different" use or are prohibited
under Grathol' s current zoning. Self storage is identified as a commercial use in the Kootenai
County zoning ordinance. See Kootenai County Ord. No. 401, Ch. 9, § 9-9-4 (H). Relevant
portions of Ordinance 401 are attached to this brief as Appendix A, with cited provisions
highlighted.
Residential use is prohibited in a commercial zone, unless it is above a building used for
commercial purposes.
Single family, two-family or multi-family dwellings are allowed
provided they are on the second and/or third floors of a
commercial building, or in a separate structure provided it is
accessory to the commercial use of the site.

Id. at § 9-9-4 (I) ( emphasis added). Therefore, even if Grathol were planning some residential
use within its property, and there is no evidence or testimony to support this speculation by
Sherwood, that use would have to be above a commercial building or accessory to a commercial
use. Therefore, the land, in this condemnation case, would still be valued at a commercial value,
which is the "highest and best use" of the property. The entire property has that "unity of use."
Industrial uses, whether light or not, are prohibited in a commercial zone, as set forth
under Ch. 9, § 9-9-7, entitled "Uses Prohibited," unless they are part of a commercial use:
Processing and manufacturing are prohibited, unless they are part
of the operation of a business or service spec(fically permitted in
the Commercial zone. Such processing and manufacturing uses
must be clearly incidental to the permitted uses on the site.

Id. at§ 9-9-7 (B) (emphasis added). Again, Sherwood's speculation that part of the 26.8 acres
east of his imaginary 30-acre parcel could be put to industrial use is contrary to law. The only
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exception would be if the use were part of a commercial use. In that case, the land would again
be valued as commercial, the "highest and best use," rather than industrial, an incidental and
lower, less valuable use.
2.

No testimony or evidence was presented that Grathol intends to
"re-rezone" any portion of the property.

Within two days of purchasing the subject property, Grathol submitted an application to
Kootenai County to rezone the entire property to commercial zoning. R. Ex. 130 (Grathol Zone
Change Application). The application was granted by Kootenai County on November 20, 2008
(R. Ex. 135 (Order of Decision)), and the entire property has been zoned commercial since.
Grathol called two of its representatives at trial, its part owner, Alan Johnson, and its vice
president, architect and site planner, Geoff Reeslund. Neither Johnson nor Reeslund testified
that Grathol has any intention, or has even thought of, "re-rezoning" the property from
commercial to a lesser zoning such as residential or industrial zoning. Absent any evidence or
testimony to the contrary, Sherwood's speculation that Grathol might use part of the 26.8 acres
east of his theoretical parcel for residential or industrial use is nothing more than speculation, is
not probative of anything, and is barred by the Kootenai County zoning ordinance.
3.

In summary, Sherwood's speculation that the Grathol property did
not have "unity of use" has no support in the record.

As found by the District Court, all testimony and evidence presented at trial established
that the "highest and best use" of the entire Grathol property is for commercial development,
both before and after the taking. This finding is also in accord with Grathol's application for
rezoning and the decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners approving the
rezoning of the entire property to commercial use. This finding is also in accord with the
development plans presented by Grathol and the testimony and evidence showing that the 56.8acre property would be developed as a mixed-use commercial development.
- 30 -

Even Sherwood did not testify that the eastern 26.8 acres would not be used for
commercial development. The most he offered was that the 26.8 acres east of his theoretical 30acre parcel "might" be put to a "different" use. He did not testify what that use might be. More
importantly, it was well established from all of the otheitestimony and evidence, Grathol's
successful rezoning, and Grathol's site plans, that Grathol intends to use all of the property for
commercial development.
In short, Sherwood's opinion that the 56.8-acre Grathol property did not have "unity of
use" had no support in the record. At a minimum, far more than a preponderance of the evidence
exists to support the District Court's finding, as the trier of fact and charged with weighing the
evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses, that the 56.8-acre Grathol property is the
"larger parcel."

VIII. SHERWOOD'S OPINION OF THE LARGER PARCEL IS CONTRARY TO
IDAHO LAW.
Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel in this case is contrary to Idaho statutes, jury
instructions, and the case law of the Idaho Supreme Court. Because the District Court's factual
determination of the "larger parcel" in this case was supported by all the facts, and by all the
testimony except Sherwood's personal opinion, the District Court had no need to decide whether
his approach was permitted by Idaho law. ITD, on the other hand, has consistently argued that
Sherwood's approach is barred as a matter oflaw.

A.

Idaho Statutory Provisions Bar Sherwood's Opinion Of The "Larger
Parcel."

Idaho Code§ 7-707 states that "[t]he complaint must contain: ... (5) A description of

each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or only a part,
of'an entire parcel or tract." Idaho Code§ 7-707 (emphasis added). In this case, no 30-acre
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parcel or tract ofland exists. Rather, the "whole" or "entire parcel or tract" is the 56.8 acres
owned by Grathol.
Idaho Code § 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation.
The Court, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon
must ascertain and assess: ... If the property sought to be
condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel: (a) the
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to
be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintifft.]
I.C. § 7-711(2) (emphasis added). In Idaho, the "larger parcel" is the property owned by the
defendant, so long at it is contiguous, has common ownership, and has the same highest and best
use. Grathol cannot create an artificial larger parcel, particularly a smaller one that simply
inflates its compensation claim. No case law or appraisal principle supports the designation of

part of a piece of property that is contiguous, under the same ownership, with the same zoning,
and having the same highest and best use as the larger parcel. That defies logic and Idaho law.

B.

Idaho Jury Instructions Bar Sherwood's Opinion Of The "Larger Parcel."

Idaho jury instructions make clear that Grathol's attempt to create an artificial larger
parcel is contrary to Idaho law. IDJ12d 7.16 states:
Just compensation is the difference between the market value of
the entire property before the taking and the market value of the
remainder after the acquisition, together with any special damages
caused by the taking, measured as of [date].
IDJI2d 7 .16 (emphasis added). The entire Grathol property is 56.8 acres, not 30 acres. Not even
Grathol 's witnesses disputed the fact that the remainder of the Grathol property after the taking
is 40.5 acres (56.8 - 16.3 = 40.5 acres). The agreement as to the remainder necessarily reflects
the reality that the "larger parcel" is 56.8 acres.
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The Comment to IDJ12d 7.16 states: "This instruction applies where there is a partial
take with severance damage to the remainder and no offsetting benefit." Comment, IDJI2d 7.16.
It is undisputed that this is a partial taking case and that Grathol sought to recover severance
damages. Therefore, IDJ12d 7 .16 governs the determination of just compensation in this case,
and that determination begins with the market value of the entire property, not an artificial or
imaginary portion of the entire property.
Similarly, IDJI2d 7.16.1 sets forth factors that may be considered in determining what
compensation should be paid for severance damages, if any, "to the remainder of the property."
IDJI2d 7.16.1 (emphasis added). The instruction makes clear that these factors may only be
considered to the extent that they are found to "affect the market value of the property." Id. The
Comment to IDJI2d 7 .16.1 is particularly germane to the "larger parcel" issue.
Where there is no benefit claimed to the remainder, the approach
of State v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of determining just
compensation by subtracting the fair market value of the remainder
from the fair market value of the whole before the take would
eliminate the necessity for this instruction. Where, however, the
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this
instruction might be useful.
Comment, IDJI2d 7 .16.1 (emphasis added). The entire statutory scheme in Idaho, as reflected in
the jury instructions, is premised on the market value of the whole property and the market value
of the remainder.
These principles are further demonstrated in IDJI2d 7.16.5, which states that "Severance
damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel belonging to the

defendant." IDJI2d 7.16.5 (emphasis added). The larger parcel is the whole property belonging
to the defendant. Again, Idaho's statutes and jury instructions are based on the determination of
the fair market value of the whole property owned by the defendant and the remaining property
after the taking.
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C.

Sherwood's Opinion Of The "Larger Parcel" Is Barred By The Case Law Of
The Idaho Supreme Court.

The Idaho Supreme Court has long enforced the fundamental principles discussed above.
In Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568,
119 P. 60 (1911), the Court cited the provisions ofldaho Code now codified as§ 7-711 and held:
It will be observed by the foregoing statute that under the laws of
this state three facts are to be determined in a condemnation suit
where it is not sought to take the entire tract of land but only a
portion thereof First, the value of the property sought to be
condemned together with all the improvements thereon pertaining
to the realty; second, if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of the larger parcel, the damages which will
accrue to the remaining portion by reason of the severance must be
assessed; and, third, if the property sought to be condemned
constitutes a part ofa larger parcel, the benefits which will accrue
to the remaining portion after the severance of the part condemned
must be ascertained and assessed and be deducted from the
damages that will be sustained by the severance.

Id. at 581, 119 P. at 64 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that ITD is not condemning "the
entire tract ofland" owned by Grathol, "but only a portion thereof." It is also undisputed that the
condemned property is "part of a larger parcel." And, lastly, it is undisputed that "the entire tract
ofland" owned by Grathol is 56.8 acres. No factual or legal basis exists for determining just
compensation in this case based on an artificial 30-acre segment of "the entire tract ofland."
In Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912), the Idaho
Supreme Court, again citing the statutory provisions now codified as Idaho Code § 7-711,
explained:
Under the provisions of the statute it was not necessary that the
jury should find the value of each legal subdivision of the tract
sought to be condemned. If, however, there is more than one
parcel of land, or several separate parcels or tracts, each
separated from the other, then it is necessary for the jury to
determine the value of each separate tract or parcel. But where the
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value then may be fixed
as a single parcel or tract. "Parcel" or "tract" o_f land, as used in
this section, does not mean legal subdivision, but a consolidated
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body o_f land, and the finding of the jury may be upon each single
parcel or tract of land.
Id. at 171-72, 121 P. at 92 (emphasis added). In this case, the Grathol property has not been
subdivided. No separate parcels are "each separated from the other." Rather, the undisputed
facts are that Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property. By any definition, the Grathol
property is a "consolidated body ofland."
In State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112 (1955), the Idaho Supreme
Court began by noting:
Under our Constitution and statutes, Art. I, § 14, Idaho
Constitution and sections 7-711 and 7-714 LC., a defendant in a
condemnation suit is entitled to be paid in money the value of the
property to be taken and the damages which will accrue to the part
not taken because of its severance.

Id. at 51, 286 P .2d at 1116. The Court then described the formula for determining just
compensation in Idaho:
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has been
determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further recover
the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is determined by
market value of such remainder before and after the taking. The
difference is the severance damage.

Id. at 55-56, 286 P .2d at 1118. It would be impossible for Idaho Courts to follow this formula if
property owners were allowed to create artificial "larger parcels" and artificial "remainders."
The only workable approach, and the only approach authorized by Idaho law, is to base the
larger parcel and remainder on contiguous real property having the same ownership, the same
zoning, and the same "highest and best use." In this case, the larger parcel is plainly 56.8 acres.

State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958), demonstrates when
separate parcels ofland, but under common ownership, should not be considered together as a
"larger parcel" for purposes of determining just compensation for property taken and damages to
the remainder. In Fonburg, the state sought to condemn 12.76 acres ofFonburg's farm to build a
- 35 -

new highway. Id. at 274,328 P.2d at 61. A railroad line divided Fonburg's property in the
before condition. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 62. Fonburg also owned "land non-contiguous to the
land through which the new road crosses, namely, a residence and farm land, located in or near
Culdesac, and north from the railroad track, his dwelling being approximately 600 to 1,000 feet
distant from the land taken." Id. Fonburg sought severance damages for impacts on the land
where his home was located. In other words, Fonburg wanted his home and surrounding
property to be included with his farm as part of a "larger parcel" ofland, a portion of which was
being condemned by the state. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this claim.
The contention of appellant in assignments of error and arguments
here made, that his residence in Culdesac, and ownership ofland
non-contiguous to and disconnected with the land sought to be
condemned should be considered as an element of severance
damage is not sustainable.
The different parcels of defendant's land, separated and located at
a distance, one from the other, one south of the track and the other
north, are not severed by the proposed road. The land separating
the two parcels of defendant's land is owned by third persons. The
trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury to allow
severance damages in this regard.
Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64. In this case, Grathol's property is all contiguous. It is not divided by

a railroad line, and no third party owns land between the artificial 30-acre parcel used by
Sherwood and the rest of the Grathol property. On the contrary, the Grathol property is all
contiguous. It is a "consolidated body ofland." Big Lost River, 21 Idaho at 160, 121 P. at 92.
In State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P .2d 56 (1969), the district court and
the Idaho Supreme Court had no difficulty identifying the larger parcel ofland to be "a 40 acre
tract belonging to defendants," id. at 20,454 P.2d at 57, despite the fact that the 40 acres was
actually divided into separate tracts. In Collier, the state filed a condemnation action

to acquire 25.47 acres ofland located in Ada County for the
purpose of constructing thereon an interchange between Broadway
Avenue, Boise, and Interstate Highway SON. The property to be
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acquired was part of a 40 acre tract belonging to defendants. The
land remaining in possession of defendants after the taking is
approximately 14.5 acres divided into five separate tracts. The
entire area was characterized as undeveloped, dry graze land. The
best use for the land apparently was industrial.
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, Grathol owns a 56.8-acre tract ofland. Three of the four

valuation witnesses who testified agreed that the land has the same highest and best usecommercial development. As in Collier, the Grathol property is undeveloped land. In Collier,
the larger parcel was found to be the entire 40-acre tract, even though it was actually divided into
separate tracts, five of which remained after the taking. In Grathol, the property has not been
divided into tracts. If the Court deemed the larger parcel to be the whole property owned by the
Colliers, even though it had actually been divided, it makes even more sense to do so in this
case, where the Grathol property has not been divided.
In State ex. rel. Symms v. City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972), the
state sought to condemn 14 acres ofland owned by the City of Mountain Home for Interstate 80.
As described by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The property taken (about 14 acres) was part of a larger tract of
land (255.44 acres) which was purchased by the city in 1963 for
$36,000 and which was to be developed and used for recreational
purposes, including an eighteen-hole golf course, a trap shoot, a
fishing and skating pond, a park, trailer parking, an archery range,
and hiking areas.
Id. at 530, 493 P .2d at 3 89. After a jury trial, the state appealed the verdict arguing, in part, that

the city could not recover severance damages to the land where the golf course was located
because it was distant from the area of the taking. Id. at 531,493 P.2d at 390. The Idaho
Supreme Court denied this part of the appeal, finding that the jury properly concluded that the
"larger parcel" was the entire 255.44 acres ofland owned by the city. Id. at 532, 493 P.2d at
387.
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In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that "[i]f, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part
of a larger tract held by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as zf it constituted an
entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same owner." Id. at

531,493 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at hand.
Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal division
or any physical separation from the other Grathol property.
The Court in Mountain Home further held:
The question raised by the state is, in essence, whether the 255
acres owned by the city (and including the golf course land) may
properly be considered a 'larger parcel,' only a part of which is
sought to be condemned, within the meaning of LC. § 7-711.
'Parcel,' as used in this section, means a consolidated body ofland.
Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 171-172,
121 P. 88 (1912). Ordinarily, the question whether two pieces of
land constitute a single parcel is a practical one for the jury, which
should consider evidence on the use and appearance of the land, its
legal divisions, and the intent of its owner.
Id. at 532, 493 P.2d at 391. In the case at hand, no 30-acre parcel exists. Therefore, no grounds

exist for even considering whether the artificial 30-acre parcel is part of a larger parcel or not.
Since the 56.8 acres of the Grathol property is not divided or separated in any way, no legal or
factual basis exists to take a smaller part of the whole and call the smaller piece the "larger
parcel."
The criteria set by the Court in Mountain Home also make clear that the larger parcel is
the entire Grathol property. It is all zoned for the same use. Its appearance is the sameundeveloped land. No legal division exists creating the 30-acre parcel. Grathol's site plans
(both in the before and after) show commercial development on the land east of the artificial 30acre parcel. Therefore, the intended use of the property is the same.
In City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the Idaho
Supreme Court noted that "Courts typically reject the so-called 'conceptual severance' theory
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the notion that whole units of property may be divided for the purpose of a takings claim." Id. at
848, 136 P.3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Sherwood attempted to divide the
whole for the purpose of enhancing its recovery in a takings case. No legal subdivision or
physical barrier exists that creates the 30-acre parcel. The 30-acre parcel only exists in the
opinion of Sherwood.
In City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 101,437 P.2d 615,617 (1968), the City of
Caldwell condemned a portion of the Roark property for the expansion of the Caldwell airport.

Id. at 100, 43 7 P .2d at 616. The Roarks had previously platted their property for residential
development and the plat had been accepted and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roarks
had marked the proposed streets and alleys for their development and utility services had been
made available to the property. Id.
At trial, the Roarks sought just compensation based upon the value of individual lots in
their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's instructions requiring
the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel and instructing the jury
that the values given to hypothetical parcels in the Roarks' development plans were not to be
considered. Id. at 100-01, 437 P.2d at 616-17. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarks'
argument and upheld the trial court's instructions. Id. at 101-02, 437 P.2d at 617-18. The same
result should be reached here.
In summary, the case of this Court clearly bars Sherwood's opinion of the "larger parcel"
in this case.

D.

"Higher Value" is not a criteria, let alone a controlling criteria for
determining the "larger parcel."

Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the western 30 acres is
more valuable than the other 26.8 acres. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III. at 503:7-13, 504:2-6. "Higher
value" is not one of the criteria for detennining the larger parcel under either Idaho law or
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professional real estate appraisal. The undisputed criteria are unity of title, unity of use, and
contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every property owner could use the comer or
frontage of its property to set the unit value for the condemned property and the "before" and
"after" value of the remainder. This is not allowed under Idaho law.
E.

The Cases Cited By Grathol Do Not Support Sherwood's Opinion Of The
Larger Parcel.

Grathol has cited selective portions of certain Idaho Supreme Court decisions to
establish, at most, that the determination of the "larger parcel" is a fact-based determination.
Grathol Br. at 17-19; 28-29. As the trier of fact, this determination was squarely within the
province of the District Court to make. The District Court heard Sherwood's testimony, found it
to be unpersuasive, particularly in light of all the other evidence, and found no reason to find
anything other than that the "larger parcel" in this case is the 56.8 contiguous parcel, owned
entirely by Grathol, and having as the same, undisputed, "highest and best use" of commercial
development.
None of the Idaho cases cited by Grathol support Sherwood's theory of the larger parcel
in this case. Therefore, it relies on an Arizona case, City ofPhoenix v. Wilson, 21 P .3d 3 88
(Ariz. 2001). However, Wilson both reinforces the conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is
contrary to law and is so different factually that it has no bearing on this case.
The Wilsons owned 23 .34 acres of land. The city sought to condemn 1.4 acres at the
comer of the property. Id. at 390. At the time of the taking, the entire property was zoned as
low density residential development. Id. However, the "General Plan for the City of Phoenix"
classified the area as one that should be rezoned for high-density residential use, such as
apartments. Id. On that basis, the Wilsons' appraiser testified that the highest and best use of a
5-acre portion of the 23.34 acres was for "a school, place of worship, or other commercial but
residentially compatible uses such as professional offices, dependent care facility, hotel, or mini- 40 -

storage." Id. The appraiser also testified that it was "very likely" that the 5 acres would be

rezoned. Id. Thus, the appraiser concluded that the 5-acre parcel had a different highest and best
use than the remaining portion of the Wilson property. Id.
In ruling on the propriety of the appraiser's opinion of the larger parcel, the Supreme
Court of Arizona held:
Unlike the strip-taking/street-widening cases on which the court of
appeals relied, the subject property could clearly be so divisible.
The jury concluded that a 5-acre intersection comer, which could
probably be rezoned for different and higher use than the rest of
the tract, would have a different and higher value than the
remainder of the property. Once that is accepted, the owner is
entitled to that higher value when the property is taken, whether
the taking is of all or only a part of the more valuable portion.

Id. at 394 (emphasis added).

In this case, neither Sherwood nor any other witness testified that the 30-acre parcel
identified by Sherwood could or would be rezoned to a higher and better use than commercial.
Nor was there any testimony that the eastern acreage not valued by Sherwood would be rezoned
to a lower or different "highest and best use" other than commercial. Grathol had all of the 56.8
acres rezoned to commercial soon after it bought the property in 2008. Its plans call for
commercial development on the entire property. No one but Sherwood testified that the property
"might" be put to any use other than commercial development. Even his testimony was only
speculation, and the uses he speculated might be put on the eastern portion of the property were
barred by the Kootenai County zoning ordinance.
In Wilson, the premise of the appraiser was that a rezone was "very likely." Id. at 390.
The holding of the Court was further premised on the fact that the rezone would lead to a
"different and higher use than the rest of the tract." Id. at 394. In this case, the property has

already been rezoned. In the absence of testimony of another "very likely" rezoning, or even a
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different highest and best use than commercial development, the holding in Wilson has no
bearing on this case.
F.

Other Cases From Outside Idaho, Previously Cited By Grathol, Do Not
Support Sherwood's Opinion Of The Larger Parcel.

Although it has not done so in its brief on appeal, Grathol cited a number of other nonIdaho cases in its post-trial brief to try to show that Sherwood's artificial larger parcel could
serve as a legitimate basis for determining just compensation in this case. However, none of the
cases cited by Grathol provide a legal or factual basis to allow Sherwood's opinion of the larger
parcel to be used in determining just compensation in this case. See R. 1230 at 1245-51 (ITD's
Response to Defendant's Post Trial Brief) (showing that none of the cases cited by Grathol
supported its position on the larger parcel in this case). Moreover, as discussed in Section III.AC above, numerous Idaho Supreme Court decisions, as well as Idaho's eminent domain statutes
and jury instructions, bar Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel.
G.

Conclusion.

In Idaho, the "larger parcel" is the property owned by the defendant, so long at it is
contiguous and has the same highest and best use. Sherwood had no facts to support an artificial
larger parcel. Idaho's Supreme Court decisions, eminent domain statutes, and jury instructions
make clear that Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is contrary to Idaho law. No case law or
appraisal principle cited by Grathol supports the designation of part of a piece of property that is
contiguous, under the same ownership, with the same zoning, and having the same "highest and
best use" as the larger parcel.
Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel" in an attempt to support Grathol's
exorbitant compensation demands. Idaho law bars the use of an artificial division of property as
the basis for determining just compensation in a condemnation case.
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Sherwood's report was filled with unsupported assumptions and conclusions. His report
contained little if any reliable or verifiable analysis or probative value. Thus, the District Court
found:
When an appraiser is presenting an opinion, utilizing the
methodology of a hypothetical parcel based upon its value to a
proposed future development, and created by the appraiser for his
own use in preparing his opinion as to value, the appraiser would
be well served by presenting a full appraisal report, in its most
complete fashion, and made easy to understand ... Therefore, this
Court finds that Sherwood's report, calculations, and trial
testimony were all difficult to understand and provided little
assistance to the trier-of-fact in attempting to determine the value
of the partial take.

*

* *

Overall, the nature and manner of Sherwood's testimony
leads the Court to find that Sherwood was more comfortable with
indirect, confusing, opaque, and brief testimony than with clear
and direct testimony. As mentioned before, Sherwood's report
expressly states that it is "restricted," "abbreviated," and "difficult
to understand." The Court makes no attempt to question the
reasons this was done, but the down side for Sherwood is that the
Court finds his testimony ... unpersuasive and oflittle probative
value for the trier-of-fact[.]
R. 1265 at 1284, 1293 (Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment).
In addition to the obvious shortcomings of his appraisal in this case, Sherwood has had as
many as 5 disciplinary actions brought against him by the agencies of the State ofldaho and the
State of Washington charged with regulating appraisers. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 603:13-606:21.
IX.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE REMAINDER
OF THE GRA THOL PROPERTY DID NOT SUFFER ANY SEVERANCE
DAMAGES.
A.

Introduction.

The District Court's detennination that there were no severance damages as a result of
ITD's US-95 Project was proper and fully supported by the evidence in the record. Grathol
argues that the District Court erred in not using the testimony of non-valuation witnesses,
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Reeslund and Hedley, to make an award of severance damages in the amount of an alleged
increase in costs for a future development. Grathol Br. at 37-41. As described by Grathol,
Reeslund testified that it would cost more than $1 million for Grathol to install a utility and
sewer connection to the western-most remainder of the Grathol property after the taking. Id. at
37. Grathol also claims that Hedley testified that development costs would be greater after the
taking. Id. at 38-41.
Grathol's argument on severance damages fails for several reasons.
First, no testimony by either Reeslund or Hedley would support an independent award of
severance damages under controlling eminent domain law.
Second, Grathol's argument that the District Court failed to consider Reeslund's
testimony is contrary to the record. Grathol agreed, prior to trial, that all testimony regarding
impacts on the remainder property were incorporated into Johnson's testimony regarding the
before and after value of the remaining property and that no separate or discrete items of
severance damages were being sought. The record clearly reflects that the District Court
considered Johnson's valuation testimony in detail.
Third, Grathol's claim for a separate award of severance damages based on Reeslund and
Hedley's testimony is being made for the first time on appeal, and is therefore barred by law.
B.

Standards Governing Severance Damages Under Idaho Law.
1.

Severance damages are measured by the difference in the fair market
value of the remainder property before and after the taking.

In Idaho, "[i]t is a well-established principle that where the public's use of the
condemned land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled
to recover this loss (typically referred to as 'severance damage') in addition to the value of the
invaded land." C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 P.3d 194,202
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(2003) (parentheses in original); Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). Idaho's civil jury instructions are in
accord, defining "severance damages" as:
a.
A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the
taking or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or
b.
A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the
construction upon and use put to the property taken.
IDJI2d 7.16.5.
The method for calculating severance damages in condemnation cases is set forth in
Idaho's civil jury instructions:
Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market
value of the remainder immediately before the taking, and
deducting from this value the fair market value which results after
the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the
project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
IDJI2d 7.16.5. This method is commonly referred to as the "before and after" rule. Stated as a
formula, the method for determining severance damage in Idaho is:
Value of Remainder Before Taking
- Value of Remainder After Taking
Severance Damages

2.

Severance damages (the decrease in value, if any, of the remainder)
must be caused by the severance.

Severance damages are not available in every condemnation case involving a partial
taking. Rather, severance damages are limited to only those damages to the remaining property
caused "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned." Idaho Code§ 7711(2) (severance damages are "the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff') (emphasis added).
Idaho's Supreme Court cases are in accord. See Pac(fic Northwest Pipeline Corp. v.

Walker, 80 Idaho 105, 109, 326 P.2d 388, 391 (1958) (to be compensable, the alleged severance
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damages must have accrued "because of' the take) (emphasis added); C&G, Inc., 139 Idaho at
148, 75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, specially concurring) (severance damages are only recoverable
if they are actually "caused by the public use") (emphasis added). See also 8A NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN§ 16.02[ 1] (3d ed. 2002) (stating "severance damages may be defined as
damages or diminution in the value of the remainder resulting from the taking of a portion of a
tract of land") (emphasis added).
3.

To justify an award of severance damages, there must be a decrease in
the fair market value of the remainder.

Consistent with Idaho's eminent domain laws and civil jury instructions, severance
damages have been limited to cases where the remaining property decreases in value as a result
of the taking or the construction and use of the property taken. See, e.g., Ada County Highway

Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,893, 26 P.3d 1225, 1230 (Ct. App. 2001) (affirming district
Court's determination that landowner's property "incurred no severance damages as a result of
the [t]ake"); 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN§ 145 (2013) ("Under some circumstances, severance
will not effect a change in the value of the remaining portion of an owner's property, and if there
is no depreciation in the market value of such remaining part as a result of the taking of a portion
of the land there is no severance damage.").
C.

The District Court Applied The Proper Standard.

The District Court properly applied the standard for determining severance damages in
accordance with Idaho's eminent domain laws. As stated by the District Court, "[t]he measure
of severance damages in this case, as agreed to by Grathol, was to be based upon opinion
testimony as to the difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the
taking." R. at 1296 (Post-Trial Memorandum Decision & Order for Judgment).

- 46 -

D.

Grathol Agreed To The Proper Measure Of Severance Damages, And
Represented That Its Claims For Severance Damages Would Be Included In
Johnson's "Before And After" Valuation.

No dispute exists over the proper standard for determining severance damages in this
case. Before trial, Grathol conceded that the "before and after" standard is the proper method for
determining severance damages. R. at 735-36 (Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance
Damages); Tr. of Proceedings, at 7:6-9:5 (Feb. 13, 2011); R. at 1269-70 (Post-Trial
Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment.).
Grathol also conceded that its claimed severance damages would be based upon the
"before and after" rule. Therefore, its new claim for severance damages based upon Reeslund's
and Hedley's testimony regarding development costs, is contrary to its pre-trial concessions and
representations that its severance damage claims, including any claim for damages based upon

impacts to its development plan, "are not claims for discreet compensable special damage
amounts, and that any loss based upon those claims is incorporated within the damages based
upon the difference in fair market value of the remainder before and after the take, as set forth in
Grathol's supplementary expert witness disclosures [R. at 720-729]." R. at 735-36 (emphasis in
original); Tr. of Proceedings, at 7:6-9:5 (Feb. 13, 2011). See also R. at 1269-70 (Post-Trial
Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment). Grathol has not raised any issue on appeal
challenging the standard applied by the District Court for determining severance damage in this
case or the Court's Order regarding severance damages (R. at 735-36).
1.

History and record of Grathol's concessions.

Before trial, ITD filed a motion in limine to exclude claims for severance damages barred
by law. R. at 359-62 (ITD's Motion in Limine (Jan. 6, 2012)). After a hearing on ITD's motion,
the Court concluded that the nature and amount of Grathol' s severance damages "are not
sufficiently identified in any way that the District Court could detennine what, if any, evidence
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would be admissible at trial on the severance damage claims." R. at 713 (Order Re: Plaintiffs
Motion In Limine (Feb. 3, 2012)). Accordingly, the District Court ordered Grathol to submit
supplemental expert witness disclosures that provided "( 1) evidence for the evaluation of a fair
market value for the remainder parcel of Grathol' s property before and after the take, and (2)
evidence as to the nature and amount of any items of special damages claimed as severance
damages." Id.
In response to that Order, Grathol submitted supplemental expert disclosures identifying
two valuation witnesses-Sherwood and Johnson-and detailing the valuation opinions and
methodologies to which the two witnesses would testify at trial. R. at 720-29 (Grathol's
Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure (Feb. 10, 2012)). After that filing, the District Court
held a hearing at which Grathol conceded that its claim for severance damages would be based
on the "before and after" rule and that it would not seek damages independent of "the difference
in fair market value before and after [the project]." Tr. of Proceedings, at 7:6-9:5 (Feb. 13,
2011). The District Court then requested confirmation from Grathol as to whether its summation
of Grathol' s concession and agreement was correct, and in response, counsel for Grathol
responded that the Court's summary was "spot on." Id. at 9:4-5.
The District Court then issued its Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages,
which confirmed Grathol's representations and agreement regarding its claims for severance
damages and how those damages would be presented and calculated at trial. R. at 734-37 (Order
Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages). The District Court's Order stated that at the
Februrary 13, 2012 hearing, "Grathol' s counsel conceded that Grathol' s claims for severance
damages are incorporated or merged into its expert witness disclosures that provide opinion
testimony as to the amount of severance damages claimed for the remainder parcel based upon
the difference between the fair market values for the remainder parcel before and after the take."
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R. at 735. The Court further confinned that "Grathol's counsel affirmatively stated that
Grathol's damage claims for the remainder, i.e. visibility, access and impact on development
plan, are not claims for discreet compensable special damage amounts, and that any loss based
upon those claims is incorporated within the damages based upon the difference in fair market
value of the remainder before and after the take, as set forth in Grathol's supplementary expert
witness disclosures [R. 720-29]." Id.
Based upon Grathol' s representations, the District Court ordered that:
Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any separate discreet
severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated
in Grathol's expert witness disclosures as to the before and after
fair market values for the remainder parcel.
R. at 735 (emphasis added). Grathol has not appealed the District Court's Order regarding

severance damages nor has it raised any challenge to the propriety of the Order on appeal.
Based on the District Court's Order, and Grathol's representations and
acknowledgements, which are consistent with Idaho eminent domain law,
1. the "before and after" standard is the appropriate for calculating severance
damages at trial;
11. Grathol's severance damage claims would not be "claims for discreet
compensable special damage amounts";
111.

the severance damage claims would be "based upon the difference in fair
market value of the remainder before and after the take," and would be
"incorporated or merged into its expert witness disclosures" of Sherwood
and Johnson, which are located in the record at R. 720-729; and

1v. Grathol was precluded from seeking a separate award of severance
damages based upon impacts to its development plans.
Id.

2.

Grathol now seeks to reverse itself and assert a new claim for
severance damages raised for the first time on appeal.

Grathol' s severance damage arguments on appeal run contrary to each of the above
requirements agreed to by Grathol before trial. First, neither Reeslund nor Hedley offered any
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testimony regarding the fair market value of the Grathol property, severance damages, or a
"before and after" analysis of value for the Grathol property. Second, Grathol's new argument
suggests that it is entitled to a discrete amount of damages based upon Reeslund's testimony of
utility and sewer connection costs and Hedley' s testimony of Grathol' s general development
costs. Third, none of Grathol' s new "damage" claims based on the testimony of Reeslund and
Hedley are "based upon the difference in fair market value of the remainder before and after the
take" and even if they were, they were required to be "incorporated or merged" into Sherwood or
Johnson's valuation testimony. And finally, Grathol was barred from seeking a separate award
of severance damages based upon impacts to its development plans.
Grathol's new claim overlooks a fundamental premise-that is, in order for Reeslund or
Hedley' s testimony to serve as a basis for severance damages, they must have testified to a
decrease in the fair market value of the property as a result of the project. C&G, Inc. v. Canyon
Highway Dist. No. 4,139 Idaho 140,148, 75 P.3d 194,202 (2003); Idaho Code§ 7-711; IDJI2d

7-16.5. The part missing from Grathol's analsyis is that neither Reeslund nor Hedley were
valuation witnesses, and neither presented testimony regarding the value of the Grathol property
or that the property's fair market value decreased because of the project. Absent any valuation
testimony or connection to a decrease in the value of Grathol' s property, neither of these
witnesses' testimony could be used to make a separate award of severance damages. Therefore,
neither witness's testimony can serve as an independent basis for an award of severance damage.
E.

Neither The Testimony Of Reeslund Nor Hedley Supports A Separate Or
Independent Award Of Severance Damages.

It is undisputed that the legal standard for detennining severance damage awards in

condemnation cases is the difference in the fair market value of the remaining property before
and after the taking. Neither Reeslund nor Hedley offered valuation testimony or any testimony
relating to severance damages resulting from the taking or the project. Neither witness testified
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to the fair market value of the Grathol property, either before or after the taking, and neither
witness testified to any specific amount of severance damage or decrease in the fair market value
of the Grathol property after the take and construction of the Project.
Reeslund Testimony

In support of its severance damage argument, Grathol focuses on the portion of
Reeslund's testimony regarding an alleged $1 million cost to install a utility and sewer
connection to serve the western-most portion of Grathol' s future development. Grathol Br. at 37;
Trial Tr., Vol. III at 444:2-17. Contrary to Grathol's assertion, Reeslund's testimony about
anticipated development costs for a future, proposed development do not constitute severance
damages and cannot serve as a basis for an independent award of severance damages.
At no point during his testimony did Reeslund testify to the fair market value of the
Grathol property, either before or after the Project. Reeslund did not testify that the Grathol
property would decrease in value as a result of costs to connect utilities and sewer to the western
remainder, nor did he testify to any amount of severance damages that he believed would result
from the Project. In fact, Reeslund's testimony did not present any evidence of a connection
between Reeslund's claimed increased development costs and the fair market value of the
Grathol property as of the date of the take.
Where Reeslund did not offer any testimony relevant to the calculation of severance
damages-namely, the fair market value of the Grathol property either before or after the taking
or a decrease in that value after the Project-his testimony cannot be relied upon for an award of

severance damages corresponding to the alleged increase in development costs. C&G, Inc., 139
Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202; Idaho Code§ 7-711; IDJI2d 7.16.5. This conclusion is made more
definite by the fact that Grathol conceded, and the Court ordered, that all of Grathol's damages
would be based upon the difference in fair market value of the property before and after the take
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and that its damages would not include a specific claim for damages for impacts caused to
Grathol's development plans. (R. at 735-36; Tr. of Proceedings, at 7:6-9:5 (Feb. 13, 2011); R. at
1269-70).
Additionally, Grathol admitted at trial that Reeslund's testimony regarding developrhent
costs was not intended to constitute a discreet element of severance damage-as Grathol now
argues on appeal. During the trial, counsel for ITD objected to Reeslund's testimony as to
specific development cost estimates. Trial Tr., Vol. III at 444:18-25. The Court also raised the
issue of valuation testimony for the western remainder. Id. at 445 :6-13. In response to ITD' s
objection and the Court's questions, counsel for Grathol acknowledged that the line of
questioning of Reeslund relating to the cost of connecting utilities and sewer to the western-most
remainder was "not intended to address a line item of severance damage." Id. at 445: 19-20.
Thus, by Grathol's own admission, and in accordance with Idaho law and the District
Court's Order, Reeslund's testimony regarding future development costs for the Grathol property
does not establish severance damages. Grathol's attempt to now re-characterize Reeslund's
testimony as a new-found basis for an independent award of severance damages is improper and
should be rejected.
Hedley's Testimony

Similarly, Hedley's testimony cannot be used as a basis for an independent award of
severance damages to Grathol. At trial, Hedley testified that, both before and after the project,
Grathol's proposed development was not financially feasible because in both scenarios it would
cost more to develop the property than what Grathol paid for the land. 2 Trial Tr., Vol. IV at
736:20-738:7. In short, Hedley testified that it did not make economic sense to develop the
property in the manner proposed by Grathol.
Because of scheduling conflicts, Mr. Hedley was called out of order and offered rebuttal
testimony of witnesses who had not yet testified. Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 699:20-701 :25.
2
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The majority of Grathol's argument on severance damages focuses on Hedley's
testimony regarding the potential costs to develop the property after the completion of the US-95
Project. Grathol Br. at 38-40. Grathol's argument takes Hedley's testimony out of context and
mischaracterizes it as a potential source of severance damage. Hedley' s testimony was not a
before-and-after valuation of the property, nor did it represent any discussion or assessment of
severance damages to the property.
Hedley' s testimony demonstrated that Grathol' s proposed development did not make
economic sense, because the costs to develop the property-both before the Project and afterwas significantly greater than what Grathol paid for the property. As with Reeslund's testimony,
it is improper to calculate severance damages based upon increased development costs, where
there is no evidence that such costs resulted in a decrease in the property's value. C&G, Inc.,
139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202; Idaho Code§ 7-711(2); IDJ12d 7-16.5; R. 734-37.
Furthermore, Hedley's testimony was not that the actual development costs were greater
because ofthe project. Rather, Hedley testified that the actual costs to develop the property as

proposed by Grathol was "about a million dollars less because the right-of-way was not
included." Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 736:6-10 (emphasis added). Grathol conveniently ignores this
testimony and focuses instead on the portion of the testimony where Hedley calculates the cost
per square foot to develop Grathol's property after the project.

It is not surprising, or significant for purposes of Grathol's severance damage argument,
that the per square foot value testified to by Hedley for Grathol's development costs after the
Project was greater than the costs before the Project. The reason for the increased cost was not
because the Project made the development more expensive, but rather because there was less
property belonging to Grathol after the Project. Given the smaller size (after the taking of 16.314
acres), the per-square foot costs were greater, but the total development costs were less. Id.
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Regardless, Hedley's testimony cannot be used to justify an award of severance damages.
He did not testify to the fair market value of the property or any difference in the fair market
value before or after the taking. On the contrary, Hedley's testimony was simply that Grathol's
proposed commercial development was not financially or economically feasible either before or
after the Project.
Contrary to Grathol's suggestion, where Hedley did not offer any valuation testimony
relating to the fair market value of the Grathol property or any decrease in the property's value
after the take and the project, it would be improper and contrary to Idaho law to rely upon
Hedley's testimony to calculate severance damages. C&G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at
202; Idaho Code§ 7-711(2); IDJI2d 7.16.5; R. 734-37
F.

To Whatever Extent Reeslund May Have Testified Regarding Potential
Impacts To The Grathol Property, That Testimony Was Incorporated Into
Johnson's Valuation Testimony, Which Was Fully Considered-And
Rejected-By The District Court.

Grathol's argument that the District Court failed to consider Reeslund's testimony is
squarely refuted by the record. To the extent that Reeslund may have testified regarding
potential impacts to the Grathol property, that testimony-as conceded by Grathol and ordered
by the Court-was incorporated into Johnson's valuation testimony. R. 734-37. Grathol
conceded that any of its claims for severance damages would be incorporated or merged into its
expert witness disclosures (R. 720-29), and that the disclosures would "provide opinion
testimony as to the amount of severance damages claimed for the remainder parcel based upon
the difference between the fair market values for the remainder parcel before and after the take."
R. at 735.
Grathol also conceded that its damage claims, which included claims for impacts on
Grathol's development plan, would not be claims for separate or discrete damage amounts. Id.
Both of these concessions became the law of the case in the Court's Order Re: Defendant HJ
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Grathol's Severance Damages, where the Court ordered that "Grathol is hereby barred from
seeking any separate discreet severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated in Grathol's expert witness

disclosures as to the before and after fair market values for the remainder parcel." Id. ( emphasis
added).
ITD disagrees that any aspect of Reeslund's testimony supports an independent award of
severance damages. However, to whatever extent that Grathol's other valuation witnesses relied
upon Reeslund's testimony regarding potential impacts to the property, that testimony
necessarily became part of the valuation witnesses' opinions.
Grathol presented valuation testimony from two witnesses at trial, Sherwood and
Johnson. Sherwood testified that he did not include any severance damages based on increased
costs. Therefore, Reeslund's testimony was irrelevant to Sherwood's analysis and conclusions.
Trial Tr., Vol. III at 552:9-17; Vol. IV, 552:9-17; 553: 1-17.
Johnson testified that he considered a number of potential impacts to the Grathol
property, and then he testified to what he characterized as "severance damages." The District
Court took full account of Johnson's testimony and soundly rejected it as "unpersuasive,"
"confusing" and "contradictory at best." R. at 1293 (Post Trial Memorandum Decision and
Order for Judgment). Specifically, the District Court attempted to understand Johnson's analysis
and found that "[i]ndeed, Johnson's range of values for severance damages, where the higher
value is twice that of the lesser based upon an unexplained and mysterious methodology
incorporating an assumed completion ofGrathol's proposed development, is totally unpersuasive
in proving fair market value as of the date of the taking." Id.
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G.

Even Johnson Did Not Base His Opinion Of Severance Damages On
Reeslund's Testimony On Development Costs.

Johnson at no time testified that his so-called "severance damages" were based in a
reduction in the fair market value of the remaining Grathol property, after the taking, due to
increased development costs. In other words, even Johnson did not believe that severance
damages could or should be awarded based on Reeslund's testimony regarding development
costs.
H.

Johnson's Damages Were Not "Severance" Damages.

Johnson's current, self-described "severance damages" were a significant matter of
dispute in the case. It was established repeatedly that Johnson's valuation opinions violated
Idaho law. See R. 1011 at 1021-39 (ITD's Post-Trial Brief); R. at 1230, at 1259-62 (ITD's
Response to Grathol's Post Trial Brief). Additionally, while the amount of Johnson's claim of
damages remained the same, every time ITD showed the claim to be barred by Idaho law,
Johnson changed the name of it and the alleged nature of the damages in order to avoid dismissal
of the claims. Compare R. Ex. 156 (Grathol's Third Supp. Disc. Resp., at 3-8, characterizing
Johnson's damages as damages for construction delay), with R. at 720-29 (Grathol's
Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, characterizing damages as "downward time value and
impact adjustment), with R. Ex. J., Johnson's current rendition and in the same amount
(characterizing damages as "severance damages").
The District Court knew that Johnson was testifying to unlawful construction delay
damages, by calling them "severance" damages. "If the Court understood what Johnson was
trying to establish, the Court suspects the testimony was probably inadmissible, but its complete
absence of any probative value for the fact finder renders the question of admissibility moot." R.
1293 (Post Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment).
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I.

The District Court Found Johnson's Testimony On "Severance" Damages To
Be Contrary To Prior Court Rulings, Unpersuasive, And Not Supported By
The Facts.

The District Court took full account of Johnson's testimony and soundly rejected it as
"unpersuasive," "confusing," and "contradictory at best." R. at 1293 (Post Trial Memorandum
Decision and Order for Judgment). Specifically, the District Court attempted to understand
Johnson's analysis and found that Johnson's range of values for severance damages was based
upon an "unexplained and mysterious methodology" that incorporated an assumed completion of
Grathol's proposed development. Id. The District Court therefore found Johnson's testimony
"totally unpersuasive in proving fair market value as of the date of the taking." Id.
The District Court then noted the provisions of its prior Order on severance damages and
found that while Johnson's claim of severance damages due to the "impact to the project because
of the freeway" may have been relevant if Grathol were seeking damages based upon an alleged
adverse impact to Grathol's proposed development, but in this case, the evidence was not,
because "Grathol had agreed that it was not seeking damages for development plan damages."
Id. at 1296. The District Court then stated that "[t]he measure of severance damages in this case,

as agreed to by Grathol, was to be based upon opinion testimony as to the differences in the fair
market value of the remainder before and after the taking[]" and that Johnsons testimony
regarding severance damages-which presumably included Reeslund's testimony-"was of no
relevance to the measure of damages Grathol was seeking to recover." Id.
Thus, Grathol's suggestion that the District Court ignored evidence of severance damages
or that the Court had an "owner bias" has no support in the record. The District Court fully
analyzed the evidence presented by Grathol regarding severance damages, rejected Grathol's
evidence as unpersuasive, conflicting, and irrelevant, and determined that there were no
severance damages as a result ofITD's US-95 Project.
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J.

Before This Appeal, Grathol Never Requested An Award Of Severance
Damages Based On Increased Construction Costs. Therefore, The Law Bars
Grathol From Asserting This Claim For The First Time On Appeal.

Grathol 's severance damage argument, and its underlying premise that Grathol is
somehow entitled to an award of severance damages for the estimated increased construction
costs of its potential, future development, is improperly raised for the first time on appeal.
Because the Supreme Court does not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal,
Grathol's argument should be rejected. Duspiva v. Fillmore, --- Idaho---, 293 P.3d 651,657
(Jan. 23, 2013) ("This Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.")
(citation omitted).
At trial, Grathol presented testimony that it was entitled to an award of just compensation
of between $2,633,360 and $3,093,360 based upon Johnson's testimony or an award of what
Sherwood testified was the "Difference Rounded" in the amount of $1,775,000 to $1,880,000.
R. Ex. J; Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 636:1-8; R. at 1128, 1132 (Grathol's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law). Additionally, in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw
submitted by Grathol after the trial, Grathol requested an award of just compensation of
$3,093,360. R. at 1136-37 (Grathol's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). At
no point, did either Reeslund or Hedley testify that severance damages should be awarded based
on potential development costs, Grathol never sought to recover such damages, and Grathol
cannot now make that claim for the first time on appeal.
In reply, Grathol may argue that it raised the issue of Hedley's testimony in its post-trial
reply brief. R. at 1150-52 (Grathol's Reply to Plaintiffs Post Trial Brief). While Grathol's brief
makes a number of the same arguments asserted in its post-trial brief, Grathol expressly declined
at that time "the obvious temptation to concede the larger parcel issues addressed infi"a so as to
take advantage of Mr. Hedley's generous severance damage analysis as to the whole parent
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tract." Id. at 1152, n.2. 3 Grathol went on to admit in its post-trial brief that Hedley's testimony
"should in no event be applied beyond the remainder of the west 30 acres which is all Grathol
intends to develop." Id. Most importantly, Grathol did not ask the District Court to make an
award of severance damages based on either Reeshind or Hedley, and cannot now make this new
claim for the first time on appeal.
Any attempt by Grathol to assert different or additional severance damage claims that
were not testified to by Sherwood or Johnson or were not part of a "before and after" valuation
methodology is contrary to Idaho law, Grathol's concessions, and the District Court Order
regarding severance damages, and the belated claim should be rejected. No legal basis exists for
Grathol to assert that development costs are compensable as an independent award of severance
damages, particularly when there is no evidence of a decrease in the fair market value of the
property because of the costs-and Grathol has not asserted any legal authority to the contrary.
Grathol's claim for independent severance damages based upon Reeslund's and Hedley's
testimony is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and should be rejected.

X.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY BY
GRATHOL WITNESS ALAN JOHNSON ATTEMPTING TO RECOVER
COMPENSATION BASED ON SYLVAN ROAD.
Grathol next argues that the District Court erred in not allowing Alan Johnson, part

owner of Grathol, to testify to his belief that the future construction of Sylvan Road would
adversely impact Grathol 's planned commercial development. This argument has no merit for
the following reasons.

As discussed in detail in Section XI.E, infra, Grathol mischaracterizes Hedley' s testimony as a
type of severance damage analysis." Grathol Br. at 40-41. Hedley' s testimony was actually that
Grathol 's development costs after the completion of ITD' s Project would be "about a million
dollars less," and his testimony had no bearing on the fair market value of the Grathol property,
but rather only focused on the lack of feasibility of Grathol's development. Trial Tr., Vol. IV at
736:6-10, 737:25-738:7.
3
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First, the District Court repeatedly held that ITO is not taking land for Sylvan Road and is
not building Sylvan Road on the Grathol property. In its Motion for Possession, ITO established
that it is not condemning any land from Grathol to build Sylvan Road and is not constructing
Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. See Grathol I, ITD's Brief On Appeal in Supreme
Court Docket No. 38511, at 8, and 32-35, and the record citations therein (filed Nov. 4, 2011).
After an evidentiary hearing on January 21, 2011, based on uncontroverted testimony, the
District Court held that ITO is not condemning any land for Sylvan Road. Grathol I, Tr. of
Proceedings (Motion for Possession) at 61 :2-16.
Grathol appealed the District Court's ruling on ITD's motion for possession, contending
that ITO was in fact taking land and planning to construct Sylvan Road on the Grathol property.
This Court heard and denied Grathol's appeal of that issue, finding that ITO is not condemning
land for Sylvan Road. See Grathol I, 153 Idaho 87, 93,278 P.3d 957,963 (2012). It would be
unprecedented for that decision to be reversed now, after a costly trial and all of the effort and
expense by the District Court and the parties, especially where Grathol has never offered any
evidence of any kind that ITO plans to condemn land or construct Sylvan Road across Grathol's
property.
Nine months after the District Court's decision on ITD's Motion For Possession, Grathol
submitted expert disclosures representing that Johnson would testify to damages caused by the
taking and construction of Sylvan Road. Therefore, despite the District Court's prior ruling
barring this claim, ITO was forced to file a motion for summary judgment to dismiss any and all
claims for compensation or damages based on Sylvan Road. See R. 308 at 311, 317-24 ( ITD's
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment). After a hearing on ITD's motion on
January 27, 2012 (a year after the first ruling on Sylvan Road), the District Court entered its
order. R. 715-17 (Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012)). In that
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order, the Court held: "ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking for Sylvan Road and

damages for such alleged taking is granted, and this claim is hereby stricken." Id. at 716. Thus,
all claims for both an alleged taking and for damages based on Sylvan Road were dismissed on
summary judgment.
Second, the District Court ordered that the long-standing rule on severance damages
would apply in this case as in all other Idaho eminent domain cases. Specifically, severance
damage awards are to be based upon a decrease in the fair market value of the remaining
property caused by the taking, calculated as the difference between the before and after value of
the remainder property. See §§ IX.B and C above, and citations therein. At the hearings on this
issue, Grathol agreed that it was not seeking discrete or separate dollar amounts for specific
items or alleged impacts on its proposed development. See§ IX.D above. At the conclusion of
those proceedings, the District Court held:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grathol is hereby barred from
seeking any separate discrete damages, to include loss of visibility,
access, and development plan damages, because these claims are
incorporated in Grathol 's expert witness disclosures as to the
before and after fair market value for the remainder parcel.
R. 734-37 at 735 (Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages).
Johnson was free to and did testify fully regarding his opinion of the before and after
value of the remainder of the Grathol property, including his opinion of severance damages. See
Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 764-74, and R. Ex. J (Just Compensation). Record Exhibit J,jirst seen and

offered at trial, was the first time Johnson ever set a figure for "severance damages" and it was
not based on Sylvan Road in any way. Id. See also Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 764-74. Despite
numerous orders by the District Court requiring full expert disclosures, Johnson never disclosed

any amount for severance damages before trial. See, e.g. R. 720 at 721 & 722 (Grathol's
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Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure (Johnson's last expert disclosure, with no mention of
severance damages).
Third, Johnson freely admitted that he did not intend to offer any testimony of alleged
severance damages based on Sylvan Road.
Q.

Mr. Johnson, in your valuation do you have any discrete
number of damages, amount of damages attributable to a
future construction of Sylvan Road?

A.

I don't believe so, no.

Q.

And so that's not part of your testimony?

A.

No.

Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 801:16-21.
Johnson had not disclosed any testimony of severance damages based on Sylvan Road
prior to trial, and had no testimony to offer as to an amount of severance damages at trial. Given
that and the previous rulings dismissing claims for compensation and damages based on Sylvan
Road (that have never been challenged by Grathol), the District Court did not err, and certainly
did not commit reversible error, by excluding vague, non-specific, testimony about an alleged
impact on a proposed future development plan, based on a road that may or may not be built, at
some time in the future, by someone other than ITD.
Fourth, if Sylvan Road is ever built, it will be Grathol' s responsibility to build it to serve
its commercial development and the multiple parcels and multiple commercial tenants within the
development. See Grathol I, ITD's Brief On Appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 38511-2011
at 9-11, 39-40 (filed Nov. 4, 2011 ). All commercial developers in Idaho are responsible for
building roads within commercial developments. Id. Grathol cannot seek public compensation
for a road that Grathol needs for its own private development.
Lastly, Grathol contends that "were it not for ITD's project, there would never be any
requirement to construct Sylvan Road to provide access through the property." Grathol Br. at 44.
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Grathol made this same argument in response to ITD's motion for summary judgment, and was
soundly refuted by ITD. See R. 648 at 661-64 (ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment), and citations to the record and expert reports therein. The undisputed facts
are that Kootenai County will require Grathol to build an interior roadway (whether called
Sylvan Road or not) to serve a commercial development of this size whether or not ITD proceeds
with the US-95 Project. Id. The need for Sylvan Road is due to Grarthol's development, not the
US-95 Project. For these reasons, the District Court granted ITD's motion for summary
judgment. See R. 715-17 (Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2).
In summary, Grathol has no legal or factual basis to challenge the District Court's
evidentiary ruling on Johnson's attempt to testify, vaguely, about the alleged "impact" of Sylvan
Road on Grathol's proposed development.

XI.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING COSTS AS A MATTER
OF RIGHT AND DISCRETIONARY COSTS TO ITD.
Grathol's arguments regarding the District Court's award of costs as a matter of right and

discretionary costs to ITD are addressed in ITD's arguments on its cross appeal below.

ARGUMENT ON ITD'S CROSS APPEAL
XII.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING IDAHO CODE§ 12-117
RATHER THAN§ 7-718 TO ITD'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
Introduction.

ITD appeals the District Court's denial of ITD's motion for attorney fees. The Court's
rulings are found at R. 1161-63 (Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part, PlaintiffITD's
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees); R. 1614-15 (Final Judgment on Costs and Attorney's
Fees); and Tr. of Proceedings, at 33-36 (Aug. 29, 2012 oral ruling by the District Court on ITD's
motion for attorney fees and costs).
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B.

Idaho Code§ 7-718, not§ 12-117, Governs The Award Of Attorney Fees And
Costs In Idaho Condemnation Cases.

The District Court found ITD to be the prevailing party and awarded ITD costs as a
matter of right and a small amount in discretionary costs. However, despite finding ITD to be
the prevailing party, the Court denied ITD's motion for attorney fees. The Court mistakenly
applied Idaho Code § 12-117 to ITD' s motion for attorney fees, and denied ITD' s motion under
the incorrect standard set by § 12-117. Idaho Code § 7-718, not § 12-117, applies to the award
of costs and attorney fees in condemnation cases.
Idaho Code § 7-718 is found within Chapter 7, Title 7, the Idaho Code provisions specific
to eminent domain actions. It provides that in condemnation cases "[ c]osts may be allowed or
not, and, if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides in the
discretion of the court." Id. The provision has been held to encompass both attorney fee awards
and costs in eminent domain proceedings. State ex rel. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd.
P 'ship., 148 Idaho 718, 730, 228 P .3d 985, 997 (2010) ("Attorney fees are allowable in eminent

domain proceedings, but are not mandatory as being within the definition of just compensation.")
(citingAcarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876,673 P.2d at 107).

Idaho Code § 12-117, on the other hand, is a generally-applicable statute relating to costs
and miscellaneous matters in civil actions, and requires the movant to show that "the
non prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Unlike § 12-117, § 7-718 is
specific to eminent domain proceedings, controls over more general attorney fee award
provisions, and clearly applies to this condemnation case.
This Court has held that the generally applicable attorney fee provisions of section 12117 do not apply when a more specific attorney fee provision exists. Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho
155,162,267 P.3d 1270, 1277 (2012) (where Idaho Code§ 9-344(2) is a specific statute for
awarding attorney fees pursuant to the Public Records Act, Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121
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do not apply in actions to compel disclosure under the Act"). See First Fed. Sav. Bank of Twin

Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g, Inc., --- Idaho---, --- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 4055357, at *6 (Idaho Sept. 14,
2012) (holding that more specific statute governing attorney fees for mechanic's liens controlled
over more general attorney fees statutes ofldaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121).
The Court has also held in a variety of other contexts that specific statutes governing
attorney fee awards govern over the more general statutes found within Chapter 1, Title 12 such
as§ 12-117. See, e.g., ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, --- Idaho---, 294 P.3d 1125, 1131
(2013), 2013 WL 411354 *7 (Idaho February 4, 2013) ("[b]ecause section 45-513 is a specific
statute providing for the award of attorney fees in proceedings to foreclose a mechanic's lien,
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and 12-121, which are general statutes, do not apply."); Tomich v.

City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400,901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995) ("To the extent of any conflict
between LC.§ 12-121 and LC.§ 6-918A, we apply LC.§ 6-918A. It is not only the later statute,
but also a more specific statement of the legislature's intent about the award of attorney fees in
tort claims cases."); K. Hefner, Inc. v. Caremark, Inc., 128 Idaho 726, 732, 918 P.2d 595,601
( 1996) ("Because § 48-114 specifically addresses the subject of attorney fees in cases brought
under the Antitrust Law, it is more specific than LC. § 12-120(3 ), and is controlling in this
case.")
A similar construction of general versus specific attorney fee statutes was applied in the

Acarrequi case, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court held that the generally-applicable attorney fee
provisions of Idaho Code § 12-121-like the general provisions of§ 12-117-and the additional
burdens they impose for recovery, are not applicable in eminent domain proceedings. Rather, in
eminent domain cases, the specific statute and particularized standard of§ 7-718 applies.

Acarrequi, l 05 Idaho at 876-78, 673 P .2d at I 070-72.
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The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with the old rule requiring condemnors to always
pay costs and, since Acarrequi, has adopted and applied a new standard governing the award of
both attorney fees and costs in condemnation proceedings. See Winder, 148 Idaho at 730, 228
P .3d at 997 (citing Acarrequi and holding that "[ a ]ttorney fees are allowable in eminent domain
proceedings, but are not mandatory as being within the definition of just compensation). The
starting point for this new standard was the basic proposition that "attorneys' fees and other
expenses are not recoverable in a condemnation proceeding except as authorized by statute." Id.
The Supreme Court cited § 7-718, which provides for awards of costs to either the condemnee or
the condemnor, as the correct and applicable statute. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876, 673 P.2d at
1070.
Notably, the Acarrequi Court considered and rejected the proposition that under § 12-121
(and Rule 54( e )( 1)) a party must make a showing that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation before it can recover fees in a condemnation
case. Id. The Court expressly held that "we adopt a new view and hold that in condemnation
actions, attorneys' fees may be awarded to the condemnee without a showing and finding that the
action was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. at 876-77,
673 P.2d at 1070-71.
After Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court's rules governing attorney fee awards in
condemnation actions, based on § 7-718, were further developed in State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot

Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P .2d 695 (1991) and State ofIdaho v. Jardine, l 30 Idaho 318,
940 P .2d 113 7 (1997). In Talbot, the Idaho Supreme Court gave additional guidance on how the
trial court is to determine the prevailing party. Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at 699. And
in Jardine, the Court reaffirmed the Acarrequi and Talbot rules, and established a hierarchy
between the Acarrequi guidelines and Rule 54( d)(l )(B). Jardine, 130 Idaho at 321, 940 P .2d at
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1140. Idaho Code § 7-718 and the trilogy of cases (Acarrequi, Talbot, and Jardine) are the
controlling law governing the award of costs and attorney fees in Idaho condemnation cases.
This controlling law was cited by the Idaho Supreme Court as recently as January 2012 in Lower
Payette Ditch Co. v. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291,296,271 P.3d 689,694 (2012).
In summary, the District Court erred in applying§ 12-117 instead of§ 7-718. Having
failed to apply the correct statute and standard, the District Court's ruling on ITD's motion for
attorney fees must be reversed.
C.

Section§ 12-117 Was Correctly Applied To Grathol's Interlocutory Appeal,
But Had No Application To ITO'S Motion For Fees And Costs At The
Conclusion Of The Case.

In applying § 12-117 to ITD' s motion for attorney fees and costs at the conclusion of this
case, the District Court mistakenly interpreted the Supreme Court's June 2012 decision on an
interlocutory appeal by Grathol in this case. Tr. of Proceedings, at 33-36 (August 29, 2012). In
Grathol I, 153 Idaho 87, 96,278 P.3d 957,963 (2012), Idaho Code§ 7-718 and theAcarrequi
factors were not applicable because the Supreme Court was addressing an interlocutory appeal of
the District Court's decision granting ITD's early possession of the Grathol property. Grathol I,
153 Idaho at 91, 278 P .3d at 959. The Supreme Court was not presented with the broader issue
of attorney fee and cost awards at the conclusion of a condemnation case.
At the time Grathol I was briefed, argued and submitted to the Supreme Court on appeal,
the case had not yet been tried. Accordingly, the outcome of the case was unknown, as were the
majority of the other factors applicable to an award of attorney's fees and costs in condemnation
cases. Those factors include ( 1) whether ITD reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at
least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict (2) whether the settlement offer was timely and not
made "on the courthouse steps an hour prior to trial" and (3) whether the offer was made within a
reasonable period after the institution of action. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072;
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Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P .2d at 699. Therefore, the issue of a request for fees and costs
made at the conclusion of a condemnation case could not have been decided by the Supreme
Court in Grathol I.
Moreover, ITD did not make a request for attorney fees under the Acarrequi line of cases
in Grathol I because such a request would have been premature. In addition, the Supreme Court
clearly did not overrule, or give any indication of an intent to overrule, either the Acarrequi line
of cases or the entire statutory framework under Title 7, Ch. 7 governing the awards of attorney
fees and costs at the conclusion of condemnation cases.
Because Idaho Code § 7-718 is the controlling statute, the Court should reverse the
District Court and uphold the long-established law that Idaho Code§ 7-718 and the

Acarrequi/Talbot/Jardine trilogy of cases govern the award of attorney fees and costs in
condemnation cases.

XIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING ITD ITS REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES AFTER CORRECTLY FINDING ITD TO BE THE
PREVAILING PARTY.
Under controlling principles ofldaho eminent domain law, a district court must engage in
a two-part analysis in order to determine whether attorney fees and costs are appropriate. First, it
must make a determination of who the prevailing party is under Rule 54(d)(l )(B) and the
guidelines established inAcarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067, and its progeny. Second,
once the prevailing party has been identified, the court is to determine the amount of costs and
attorney fees to be awarded based on the provisions of Rules 54(d)(l) and 54( e)(3 ).
The District Court conducted the first half of the analysis correctly. However, because it
applied the wrong statute and standard within Idaho Code § 12-117, rather than § 7-718, the
District Court disregarded the second part of the analysis in its entirety. ITD respectfully
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requests that the Court remand this issue back to the District Court to complete the Rule 54(e)(3)
analysis.

A.

The Criteria For Determining The Prevailing Party In Idaho Condemnation
Cases.

A trilogy ofldaho cases set forth the rules governing an award of fees and costs in
eminent domain proceeding. See Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, supra; State ex rel

Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991); and State ofIdaho v.
Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997). Acarrequi established guidelines to assist the
trial court in determining the prevailing party and whether an award of costs and fees should be
made. Id. at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Those guidelines are:
( 1)

whether the condemnor reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at
least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict;

(2)

whether the offer was timely and not made "on the courthouse steps an hour
prior to trial";

(3)

whether the offer was made within a reasonable period after the institution of
action;

(4)

whether the condemnee contested the allegations of public use and necessity;

(5)

the outcome of any hearing on such a challenge;

(6)

whether the condemnor made any modifications in the plans or designs of
the project that resulted from the landowner's challenge; and

(7)

whether the condemnee voluntarily granted possession of the property
pending the resolution of the just compensation issue.

Id.

In Talbot, the Idaho Supreme Court gave additional guidance on determining the
prevailing party. 120 Idaho 825,829,820 P.2d 695,699 (1991). In Talbot, the State made a
settlement offer to the landowner approximately 15 months after the complaint was filed. While
the offer was considerably less than the amount of the jury's verdict, the trial court detennined
that the State, and not the landowner, was the prevailing party in the action and denied the
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landowner's request for attorney fees. The landowner appealed, arguing that the trial court had
abused its discretion in failing to award them attorney fees.
The Supreme Court in Talbot held that "in addition to considering the Acarrequi
guidelines the trial court must apply I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B) to detennine the prevailing party." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the landowner's arguments, upholding the trial court's ruling
that the State was the prevailing party and denying the landowner's request for attorney fees. Id.
This ruling is significant in that it expanded application of the Acarrequi cost and fee rules to
apply to both the landowner and the State.
In Jardine, the Court reaffirmed the Acarrequi and Talbot rules, and established a
hierarchy between the Acarrequi guidelines and Rule 54( d)(l )(B). After Jardine, the Acarrequi
guidelines and Rule 54( d)(l )(B) are still to be applied to determine the prevailing party, but the
provisions of the Rule only apply to the extent that they do not conflict with the Acarrequi
guidelines. Jardine, 130 Idaho at 321,940 P.2d at 1140. The Court in Jardine also held that the
issue of whether a reasonable offer of settlement was timely made is a case-specific
determination. "[E]ach case will depend on its own circumstances." Id.
B.

ITD WAS CLEARLY THE PREVAILING PARTY UNDER THE
APPLICABLE CRITERIA.
1.

ITD made an offer of settlement of at least 90% of the verdict.

On December 15, 2011, ITD made an offer of settlement to Grathol in the amount of $1.1
million. R. 1318 at 1324 (ITD's Brief in Support of Fees); R. 1366 (Offer of Settlement). The
just compensation award was $675,000. Thus, ITD clearly made an "offer of settlement of at
least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict," and satisfied this element of the prevailing party
analysis. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072.
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2.

ITD's settlement offer of $1.1 million was timely made.

ITD made its offer of settlement on December 15, 2011. Trial began on March 5, 2012.
Therefore, the offer was not made "on the court house steps an hour prior to trial." Jardine, l 30
Idaho at 320, 940 P.2d at 1139. In addition, the parties expressly agreed to extend the deadline
for making anAcarrequi offer to December 16, 2011. R. 1318 at 1325 (ITD's Brief in Support
of Fees); see R. at 1368-69. Therefore, the offer of December 15, 2011 was timely made.

3.

Grathol did not voluntarily grant possession of the property pending
resolution of the issue of just compensation.

Grathol did not voluntarily grant possession of the property prior to trial, which is
typically handled by stipulation in nearly all condemnation cases. Worse yet, counsel for
Grathol engaged in evasive delaying tactics on the issue of whether or not Grathol would enter
into a stipulation. These tactics forced ITD into difficulties with pressing funding and
construction deadlines for the US-95 Project, and forced ITD to file a motion for possession. R.
1318 at 1325 (ITD's Brief in Support of Fees).

4.

Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on meritless grounds.

In opposing the motion for possession of the condemned property, Grathol did not
challenge the statutory requirements for possession: (1) that ITD has the power of eminent
domain; (2) that the US-95 Project is a public use; (3) that the condemned property was
necessary for that use; or (4) that ITD had negotiated in good faith to purchase the property to be
condemned. See I.C. § 7-721 (2). Instead, Grathol made two baseless arguments.
First, Grathol argued that only the ITD Board, and not the Director, could sign the
administrative order of condemnation. Grathol I, 153 Idaho at 91,278 P.3d at 961; Grathol I, R.
at 95-98 (Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession). This
argument had no merit because the Director has both statutory and administrative authority to
execute administrative orders of condemnation once public highway projects are approved by the
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Board. Grathol 1, 153 Idaho at 91-92, 278 P.3d at 961-62; see Idaho Code§ 40-505 (the
Director is the administrative officer of the Board and shall exercise all necessary administrative
powers); Grathol I, R. at 165-66 (Aff. of Karl D. Vogt filed January 18, 2011) (describing
express delegation of authority by the Board to the Director to execute administrative orders of
condemnation). After losing this argument before the District Court, Grathol appealed the Order
Granting Possession of Real Property, (Grathol I, R. at 303 (filed Jan. 27, 2011)), to the Idaho
Supreme Court. Grathol's argument was soundly rejected by unanimous decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court on June 1, 2012. Grathol I, 153 Idaho at 91-92, 278 P.3d at 961-62; R. at 144249 (Decision in Supreme Court Docket No. 38511).
Second, Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on the grounds that ITD did not
negotiate in good faith to purchase a portion of the Grathol property to construct Sylvan Road
across the Grathol property. Grathol I, 153 Idaho at 92-93, 278 P.3d 957, 962-63; Grathol I, R.
at 98-102 (Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Possession). This
argument was completely baseless because ITD is not extending Sylvan Road across the Grathol
property, and ITD did not condemn any portion of the Grathol property for that purpose. Id.
Therefore, ITD was not under any obligation to negotiate for the purchase ofland for Sylvan
Road.
After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court ruled that ITD was not condemning land
for Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Grathol I, R.
at 303-10 (Order Granting Possession of Real Property). Grathol appealed this ruling also, and
the Supreme Court rejected all claims and arguments by Grathol relating to Sylvan Road.
Grathol J, 153 Idaho at 92-93, 278 P.3d 957, 962-63; Grathol I, R. at 1442-49 (Decision in

Supreme Court Docket No. 38511).
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In short, Grathol took the routine issue of possession of the condemned property and
turned it into a prolonged legal battle that had no factual or legal merit whatsoever. This
needless battle caused ITD to incur substantial amounts in attorney fees and costs unnecessarily.

C.

The District Court Properly Found And Concluded That ITD Was The
Prevailing Party.

Based on its consideration of the applicable factors, as well as its first-hand observations
throughout the proceedings, the District Court correctly concluded that ITD was the prevailing
party. See R. at 1612 (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part ITD's Motion for Costs and
Fees; see also Tr. of Proceedings, at 50-54 (August 29, 2012) (applying Acarrequi factors and
concluding that ITD's pretrial offer was timely and was not made on the courthouse steps).
At the hearing on ITD's motion for attorney fees and costs, the District Court considered
these factors and declared that it was completely satisfied that ITD was the prevailing party at
trial. Tr. of Proceedings, at 33-34 (August 29, 2012) ("And at least for purposes of determining
whether there's an analysis that needs to be made, certainly the State had won enough here to
certainly get into the category of prevailing in part."); id. at 50 ("I don't have any problem
making a finding there that ITD was the prevailing party."). The District Court continued:
Grathol had success throughout the trial with regard to evidentiary
rulings, but when the rubber finally hit the road, I don't think there
was really any issue that Grathol prevailed on. So it's-with
regard to costs, it's hard for me to find any argument as to how
ITD would not be found to be the prevailing party except under the
usual 54(b) analysis.

Id. at 50-51.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Consider The Rule 54(e)(3)
Factors And Refused To Award ITD Its Attorney Fees After It Determined
ITD Was The Prevailing Party.

Once the determination of the prevailing party is made, the amount of attorney fees
recoverable is governed by the factors under Rule 54( e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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ITD provided a detailed analysis of these factors and how they related to and justified its petition
for fees. R. 1318 at 1327-1348 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs);
R. 1586 at 1590-1593 (ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs).
Yet the District Court disregarded the Rule 54( e)(3) factors and all of the evidence put forward
on them by ITD. The Court should therefore reverse the District Court's denial oflTD's fee
petition and should remand this issue back to the District Court so that it may complete the
second half of the attorney fee analysis.
Given The Outrageous Demands And Abusive And Improper Conduct Of
Grathol Throughout This Case, The District Court Erred In Failing To
Award Reasonable Attorney Fees To ITD.

E.

Although attorney fees are not routinely awarded to condemnors, they are authorized by
both Idaho Code § 7-718 and Acarrequi. In Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
"[ e]xept in the most extreme and unlikely situation, we cannot envision an award of attorneys'
fees and costs to a condemnor." 105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. As demonstrated below, if
this is not the extreme and unlikely case, then there is no extreme and unlikely case.
Idaho Code § 7-718 expressly authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to both
condemnors and condemnees: "Costs may be allowed or not, and, if allowed, may be
apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides in the discretion of the court." Id.
Thus, the Idaho Code expressly authorizes the award of costs to either side in a condemnation
case. The "costs" authorized under§ 7-718 include attorney fees. See Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at
876-77, 673 P.2d atl 070-71 (holding that costs under§ 7-718 include attorney fees).
A review of Grathol's conduct and abusive tactics throughout this case reflects exactly
the type of extreme conduct contemplated by this Court in Acarrequi. The abuses and improper
tactics by Grathol included:
•

Opposing the motion for possession on meritless grounds; R. 1318 at 1326-27
(ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; Grathol I, R. 90- 74 -

105 (Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Possession January 10,
2011); Tr. of Proceedings (January 21, 2011); Grathol I, 153 Idaho 87,278 P.3d
957 (2012); R. at 1442-49 (Decision in Supreme Court Docket 38511);
•

Repeatedly failing and refusing to answer discovery; R. 1318 at 1332-33 (ITD's
Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs);

•

Repeatedly failing and refusing to disclose expert opinions; R. 1318 at 1333-3 7
(ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs); R. at 112-115
(ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony);

•

Hiding expert opinions behind an inapplicable and improper assertion of the
federal "actor-viewer" exception, which only applies in federal court and only
applies to the drafting of expert reports; even in federal court, the exception does
not excuse the duty to disclose expert opinions and does not circumvent written
discovery asking for expert opinions; R. 1318 at 1334-41 (ITD 's Brief in Support
of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; R. at 112-15 ITD's Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony); R. 779-801 (ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not
Timely Disclosed);

•

Making repeated and continuing demands for compensation based on an alleged
taking for Sylvan Road-despite having no factual basis for the claims and
despite repeated rulings from the Court denying and dismissing the claims; R.
1318 at 1330-32 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs);
R. 760 at 765-66 (ITD's Trial Brief); R. 715-17 (Order re: ITD's Motion for
Summary Judgment); R. 578 at 586-90 (Grathol's Response to ITD's Motion for
Summary Judgment); R. 648 at 660-64 (ITD's Reply in Support of Summary
Judgment); R. at 241-55 (ITD's Response to Grathol's Motion to Compel); R. 308
at 317-24 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment);

•

Grathol' s insistence on raising the issue of Sylvan Road, yet again, on this appeal
exemplifies its extreme conduct in this case. Grathol argued for compensation or
damages based on a non-existent taking for Sylvan Road at least four times before
the District Court and lost each time. It lost this argument in the first appeal in
this case. See Grathol L 153 Idaho at 92-93, 278 P.3d at 962-63. It is now raising
this argument again in this appeal, causing ITD to respond to it for yet another
time. ITD should be allowed to recover its fees based on Grathol's insistence on
raising arguments unfounded in fact and law not just once, not twice, not three,
not four, but multiple times;

•

Presenting improper valuations that had no "before and after" analysis, no
understandable explanation, and numerous violations of law and deviations from
accepted appraisal standards; R. 1318 at 1345-46 (ITD' s Brief in Support of
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs); R. at 359-62 (ITD's Motion in Limine);

•

Making claims for damages that were clearly barred by Idaho law; R. 1318 at
1341-45 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs); R. 308
at 324-57 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment); R. 578 at
590-603 (Grathol's Response to ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment); R. 648 at
652-59 and 664-90 (ITD' s Reply Brief in Support of Summary Judgment);
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•

Dropping claims for damages barred by law only after forcing ITD to engage in
expensive briefing and preparation for oral argument on a motion for summary
judgment to dismiss these claims; R. 1318 at 1344-45 (ITD 's Brief in Support of
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs); R. 712-14 (Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion
Summary Judgment); and

•

Making outlandish demands for compensation that were not supported by the
market, had no relation to "fair market value," and were soundly rejected by the
Court.

In addition, Grathol's two valuation experts, Skip Sherwood and Alan Johnson, employed
improper valuation methods and tactics that initiated a host of battles that should never have
been necessary and involved fights over issues clearly barred by law or wholly unsupported by
the facts in the case. Grathol's tactics substantially and unnecessarily increased the attorney fees

and costs in this case.
The improper methods and tactics of Sherwood and Johnson included the following:
•

Failure to use the date of taking as the date of value, as required by Idaho statute;
R. 760 at 770 (ITD's Trial Brief); R. 692 at 694-702 (ITD's Reply in Support of
Motion in Limine); R. 363 at 366-74 (ITD's Motion in Limine); R. 1011 at 102123 (ITD's Post-Trial Brief);

•

The use of multiple dates of value, in violation of statute; R. 692 at 694-702
(ITD's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine); R. 363 at 363-66 (ITD's Motion
in Limine); R. 760 at 770 (ITD's Trial Brief);

•

Failure to do a "before and after" analysis of the value of the property; R. 712-14
(Order re: Plaintiffs Motion in Limine);

•

Failure to use the entire Grathol property as the "larger parcel" for purposes of
determining the "before and after" value; R. 760 at 769-70 (ITD's Trial Brief); R.
363 at 371-75 (ITD's Motion in Limine); R. 692 at 702-04 (ITD's Reply Brief in
Support of Motion in Limine); R. 1011 at 1013-21 (ITD's Post Trial Brief); R.
1265 at 1280-82 (Post Trial Memorandum Decision and Order);

•

Using sales as alleged "comparable sales" that were in far superior locations, with
substantially greater demand for commercial development, and substantially
better situated for the installation of utilities or with utilities already installed; R.
359-62 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine); R. 760 at 771-74 (ITD's
Trial Brief);

•

Sherwood's use of a negotiated settlement of a condemnation as one of his
primary "comparable sales," despite his testimony that such a transaction is not an
indication of"market value"; R. 760 at 772 (ITD's Trial Brief); R. 363 at 379-82
(ITD's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine); R. 692 at 705; 707-08 (ITD's
Reply in Support of Motion in Limine);
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•

Failure to identify, quantify, or explain any of the adjustments they made to sales
as part of the "comparable sales approach" to real estate appraisal; R. 760 at 77273 (ITD's Trial Brief); R. 363 at 375-78 (ITD's Brief in Support of Motion in
Limine); R. 692 at 704; 706 (ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion in Limine);

•

Producing only a limited, restricted appraisal report that expressly noted that third
parties would have difficulty understanding the report; R. 1265 (Post Trial
Memorandum Decision and Order);

•

Repeatedly changing valuation conclusions and the explanations for the
conclusions reached;

•

Continuing to assert claims for compensation based on the time needed for
construction of the US-95 Project (i.e., "construction delay"), despite an order
from the Court barring such claims; R. 760 at 770, 774 (ITD Trial Brief); R. 308
at 311; 324-31 (ITD's Brief in Support of Summary Judgment);R. 1011 at 102434 (ITD's Post Trial Brief); and

•

Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development
were completed. This approach was barred by law. R. 1318 at 1346 (ITD' s
Brief) in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs); R. 1586 at 1592 (ITD's
Reply Brief in Support of Fees and Costs); R. 1011 at 1035-39 (ITD's Post-Trial
Brief).

These abuses and tactics were the subject of many motions and a great deal oflitigation
before, during, and after trial. Ultimately, the District Court rejected the methods and
conclusions of Grathol' s valuation experts completely, but only after very great effort and
expense by ITD.
Contrary to Grathol's argument on appeal, Idaho law both contemplates and authorizes
an award of fees to a condemnor. And, although this Court has had multiple opportunities to
conclude that a condemnor is not entitled to recover fees or costs in a condemnation proceeding,
it has never done so. In Acarrequi, it did exactly the opposite, recognizing that such an award
may be warranted in extreme cases. Id. at 878, 673 P .2d at 1072. Idaho condemnation cases in
addition to Acarrequi support such a conclusion. In Talbot, a unanimous Court announced that
the State could be detennined to be the prevailing party such that the landowner was not entitled
to attorney fees, which are considered to be costs under Rule 54(e)(5). Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829,
820 P.2d at 699. It further noted, "[t]his Court has held that in eminent domain actions, the award
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of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court." Id., at 828, 820 P .2d at 698 (citing
Acarrequi). In Jardine, the Court, again in a unanimous decision, reviewed the Talbot decision at
length and did not change or limit the extension of the cost and fee rules to condemnors.
Grathol argues that it is unaware of any case in any jurisdiction awarding fees or costs to
a condemnor. But this Court has awarded costs to condemnors a number of times, including two
2012 cases where costs were awarded to ITD in condemnation proceedings. In the prior
appellate decision by this Court in Grathol I, the Court awarded ITD its costs. Grathol I, 153
Idaho 87, 93,278 P.3d 957, 963 (2012). Likewise, it did the same in another 2012 case, ITD v.
HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334,343,282 P.3d 595, 604 (2012). See also Ada County Highway
Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,894, 26 P.3d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 2001) (awarding costs to
ACHD in eminent domain proceeding). Contrary to Grathol's argument, condemnors can and do
recover costs in eminent domain proceedings and should be allowed to recover fees, as well, in
extreme cases like this one.
Because of Grathol' s abusive tactics, unlawful claims, and improper valuation
methodologies and abuses, before, during, and after the trial, this case became the epitome of
extreme conduct, unnecessary and prolonged battles over matters clearly barred by law and fact,
and consequent needless expenditure of great sums in fees and costs incurred primarily and
simply to enforce compliance with court orders, the rules of civil procedure, discovery
obligations, and to defeat unlawful, unsubstantiated, and astoundingly exorbitant claims for
compensation and damages. This is precisely the type of case contemplated by the Court in
Acarrequi where fees should be awarded to the condemnor, and the language in Idaho Code § 7718 clearly authorizes an award of fees and costs to ITD.
Based on the foregoing, if this case is not the "exceptional" case where the condemnor
should recover reasonable attorney fees, as held by the Court in Acarrequi, then there is no
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exceptional case. In that event, landowners will have license to engage in these abuses and
improper tactics with impunity. The law must provide a remedy under these circumstances.

XIV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ITO'S COSTS AS A
MATTER OF RIGHT AND DISCRETIONARY COSTS.
On appeal, Grathol argues that the District Court erred in awarding costs to ITD.
Contrary to Grathol's argument, condemnors have frequently been awarded their costs in
condemnation proceedings. In addition, Idaho Code § 12-117 is not the exclusive basis for an
award of fees or costs, and ITD was not required to show that Grathol acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law in order to prevail. 4 Grathol's arguments against the District Court's award
of costs have no merit and the award should be affirmed.
Grathol's only complaint on appeal as to the specific costs awarded to ITD by the District
Court concern its award of discretionary costs as reimbursement for the appraisal and testimony
fees ofITD's valuation expert, Larry Pynes. Pynes was one of two valuation experts called by
ITD. Although a condemnation case does not always warrant two valuation experts, Pynes was
necessary in this case because Grathol disclosed and ultimately called two valuation experts to
testify at trial, Grathol claimed over $7 million in damages, and Grathol's two valuation experts
employed a host of improper appraisal methods and tactics that required clarification and
refutation by ITD's experts, including Pynes. Moreover, because of the disparity between the
first appraisal obtained by ITD from Stan Moe and the valuation claims by Grathol, another
appraisal was clearly necessary and justified.
Grathol argues that the District Court failed to make a determination as to why Pynes, the
second appraiser, was necessary and exceptional. This Court need look no further than the
transcript of the District Court's hearing on ITD's motion for fees and costs to see that the

ITD addressed both of these arguments in Sections XII.A and B above, and will not repeat
those arguments here.

4
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District Court went to great lengths in explaining and justifying its award of discretionary costs
to ITD. The District Court gave at least eight reasons as to why Pynes was necessary and
exceptional. In addition, the District Court categorized Pynes' testimony not only as helpful, but
as "very helpful," "very, very helpful," "exceedingly helpful," and "extremely helpful." Tr. of
Proceedings, at 56-58 (August 29, 2012).
After determining that ITD was the prevailing party, the District Court concluded that
ITD's discretionary costs were necessary. Id. at 55. It noted that ITD was required to make
these expenditures to meet the numerous issues raised by Grathol, that its defense "was very
thorough," and that the Court did not "find fault with it." Id.
The District Court further addressed why Pynes was necessary and exceptional, providing
the following basis for its decision:
•

The case was not straightforward and typical like most condemnation cases where
each side calls one valuation expert.; Tr. of Proceedings, at 56, (August 29,
2012);

•

The case was unusual and unique, with a morass of legal issues floating around,
many of which were actually and legally incomprehensible. "[T]he need to have
that second appraisal was a result of the conduct at this particular trial"; Id. at 5657;

•

It was helpful for ITD to call a second appraiser because there were some issues
with one appraiser; Id. at 56;

•

The district court was concerned that Moe's appraisal, although credible, was low.
Id. at 57;

•

The second appraiser (Pynes) seemed more straightforward and was more
comprehensible than Grathol's expert, Sherwood. In fact, the court thought that it
"was really very, very helpful to the court in terms of providing some basis for
what the Court feels is a really credible value." Id. at 57;

•

The case "was factually very confusing with a lot of extraneous, irrelevant, but
highly confusing material floating around. So having the second appraiser
actually come in was exceedingly helpful, as far as the Court was concerned. Id.
at 57;

•

"[T]he Court's figure was somewhat in the range of what the State's second
appraiser testified." Id. at 57;
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•

The State needed to call a second appraiser to "try and clear the smoke and settle
the dust and sort you know, get the fact finder back to what is this case really all
about was extremely helpful, and it was extremely helpful because of the
exceptional nature of this particular case." Id. at 58.

Moreover, the District Court's Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment
establishes that the District Court not only relied heavily on Pynes' valuation, but adopted
wholesale both his numbers and reasoning:
Pynes testified that the value of the partial take was $675,000
($0.95 per square foot). [Trial Tr., Vol. 5 at 843 :21]. Pynes'
valuation was based upon the larger parcel being the entire 56.8
acres, for both the before and after values, and he also used the
sales comparison approach in establishing his appraisal. [R. Ex.
141A (Larry Pynes Summary of Value Conclusions)]. Pynes used
sales that had similar characteristics to the Grathol property, and
explained and quantified the adjustments he made to the
comparable sales in order to provide accurate and reliable
indications of the market value of the Grathol property at the time
of the taking. Pynes' comparables range from $0.46 to $1.19 per
square foot. [R. Exs. 139 (Pynes' Appraisal Report) and 145
(Pynes Comparable Sales Adjustment Chart)]. Pynes' appraisal
report is easy to read and understand. [See R. Ex. 139 (Pynes
Appraisal Report)]. Pynes trial testimony was also persuasive in
that Pynes provided detailed testimony as to how he came to his
valuations. Further, his valuation of the partial take is easy to
calculate, he took the before value and subtracted the after value.
Therefore, this Court found Pynes' valuation as to the partial
taking to be very persuasive and credible.
*

*

*

Therefore, this Court, as trier-of-fact, finds based upon all of the
above provided reasoning that Pynes' testimony is the most
persuasive testimony provided as to valuing the partial take. As
such, this Court determines the fair market value of the 16.314
acres partial take is $675,000.00 ($0.95 per square foot).
R. 1265 at 1287-88 (Post Trial Memorandum Decision and Order) (citation references in
original, but format changed to correspond with record cites on appeal).
Contrary to Grathol's argument, the District Court explained at great length why ITD's
costs related to Pynes were necessary and exceptional. The case was made unnecessarily and
extraordinarily complex and difficult by Grathol's baseless claims, claims barred by law, and
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constantly shifting rationales for its claims. In the face of these extraordinary circumstances,
ITD was more than justified in calling a second valuation expert. In fact, Pynes' testimony not
only provided clarification for the District Court during the trial, but ultimately provided it with
analysis and conclusions that the Court relied on heavily in its final decision.
Accordingly, the District Court's award of costs as a matter of right and discretionary
costs should be affirmed.

XV.

ITD REQUESTS THAT IT BE GRANTED ITS ATTORNEYFEES AND COSTS
ON APPEAL
ITD respectfully requests that the Court award ITD its attorney fees and costs on appeal

pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 7-718, 12-117, and 12-121. ITD is the prevailing party in this matter
and therefore is properly entitled to its attorney fees and costs under§ 7-718 and Ada County
Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 876-77, 673 P.2d 1067, 1069-70 (1983) and its

progeny. ITD made an offer of settlement that was at least 90% of the verdict in this case; ITD's
settlement offer of $1.1 million was timely; Grathol did not voluntarily grant possession of the
property; and its opposition to ITD's possession of the property was had no legitimate basis or
grounds. As discussed above, ITD is entitled to an award of its costs and attorney fees under
Acarrequi, l 05 Idaho 878, 673 P.2d at 1072, and particularly so in the present case due to the

extreme conduct of Grathol in litigation this case. ITD has set forth in detail the abuses and
improper litigation tactics excercised by Grathol in this case. See Section XII.E, supra. The
present appeal, which also lacks basis or support in law or in fact and once again includes the
issue of Sylvan Road, is no exception.
In the alternative, ITD requests an award of its attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-117 and 12-121. Grathol has pursued this appeal unreasonably and without
foundation or support in law. Grathol's appeal is based solely on its disagreement with the
District Court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses on the issues of
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the larger parcel, severance damages and Sylvan road, which is not a proper basis for an appeal.
Moreover, Grathol made no meaningful attempt to establish any errors of law by the District
Court. And finally, although Grathol implies otherwise, the District Court did not bar any of
Grathol' s witnesses from testifying on any subject or issue, except claims for compensation or
damages based on Sylvan Road, which were dismissed multiple times before trial.
Under these circumstances, ITD should be awarded its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2013.
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Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant,
Idaho Transportation Department
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KOOTENAI COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE NO. 401
CASE NO. OA-133-06 (Ordinance Text Amendments)
Title 9, Kootenai County Code
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I
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CHAPTER 9

COMMERCIAL ZONE (C)
SECTIONS:
9-9-1
9-9-2 9.01
9-9-3 9.02
9-9-4 9.03
9-9-5 9.04
9-9-6 9.05
9-9-7 9.06
9-9-8 9.07
9-9-9 9.08
9-9-109.09

GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
SITE AREAS

USES PERMITTED
FRONT, SIDE, AND REARY ARDS
USES PERMITTED - STORAGE

USES PROHIBITED
CONDITIONAL USES
RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS

9-9-1: GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED: The "General Commercial zone" is a land use
classification for a district suitable for wholesale and retail sales and services.
9-9-2: PERFORMANCE ST AND ARDS: In the Commercial zone, no building or premises shall be used, nor any
building or structure be hereafter erected or altered, unless otherwise provided in this title , except for one (I) or
more of the following uses in accordance with the following standards. A Commercial lot shall have direct access
from a public road.
All uses shall meet the following standards:
A.

Requirements of Chapter 17 of this title, Design Standards

B.

Requirements of Chapter 19 of this title, Supplementary Regulations

C.

Anticipated traffic impacts will be determined for all commercial uses using the most current edition of the
'Trip Generation Manual." A Special Notice Permit shall be required for commercial uses or buildings that
are anticipated to generate traffic impacts in excess of the following thresholds:

D.
E.

I.

For sites which access directly onto a State or Federal Highway- 25 cars per hour, or 250 vehicles per
day.

2.

For sites which access onto other public roads - 50 cars per day.

Uses on all lots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a
Special Notice Permit.
Requirements of the applicable Highway District and Idaho Transportation Department or if the site is within
an area of city impact, the city's standards for access, approaches, and street design, whichever is the higher
standard.

F.

If an existing community water system within 1,000 feet of the site is willing and able to provide water service
to the use, connection to that system shall be required.

G.

Requirements of the Panhandle Health District for sanitary sewage disposal.

H.

Requirements of the Panhandle Health District's Critical Materials Regulation.
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I.

All uses shall be in a structural Fire Protection District and meet all applicable District regulations; or absent a
structural Fire Protection District, shall incorporate fire protection measures recommended by the State Fire
Marshall.

J.

No uses shall generate sound pressure levels greater than 80 dBA as measured at the property line.

9-9-3: SITE AREAS: Fifty percent (50%) of the area of all sites must be left in open spaces free from structures.

9-9-4: USES PERMITTED:
A.

Parks, playgrounds, and golf courses.

8.

Community facilities, including fire stations, public utility installations, etc.

C.

Public or non-profit recreational buildings.

D.

Any wholesale, retail or service business.

E.

Public or private office buildings.

F.
G.

Any eating or drinking establishment, or other entertainment facility.
Hospitality businesses, such as hotels and motels, and meeting and convention facilities.

I

H.

Transfer, storage, and warehouse facilities, except outside storage must be within a sight-obscuring fence.

I
.I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I.

Single family, two-family or multi-family dwellings are allowed provided they are on the second and/or third
floors of a commercial building, or in a separate structure provided it is accessory to the commercial use of the
site. Residential uses are subject to the density requirements of the High Density Residential (HOR) zone,

J.

Recreational vehicle park .

K.

General farming, except the minimum lot area for the keeping of livestock shall be 3/4 acre.

L.

Vocational, trade, or private instructional schools, providing a specialized or single-item curriculum.

M.

Churches.

I

I

9-9-5: FRONT, SIDE, AND REAR YARDS: The following front, side, and rear yard setback requirements shall
apply in the Commercial zone.
All Buildings:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Front yard ................................ .35 feet
Side yard ...................................... none
Flanking street... ....................... 20 feet
Rear yard .................................. 15 feet

9-9-6: USES PERMITTED- STORAGE: No premises in the Commercial zone shall be used as a storage area for
any purpose other than storage of materials required in connection with the enumerated permitted uses in the
Commercial zone.
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Storage areas must conform to the minimum setback regulations of the zone. Automobiles and other machinery
normally displayed for sales purposes on an open lot may be so displayed.

9-9-7: USES PROHIBITED:

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

-I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

A.

Automobile wrecking yards and junk yards.

B.

Processing and manufacturing are prohibited, unless they are part of the operation of a business or service
specifically permitted in the Commercial zone. Such processing and manufacturing uses must be clearly
incidental to the permitted use on the site.

9-9-8: CONDITIONAL USES:
A.

Outdoor Theaters.

B.

Public Utility Complex Facility.

C.

Zoos.

D.

Radio and Television Towers.

E.

Special Events Location (Note: See the definitions of Special Events and Special Events Location in Section
9-2-2 of this Title).

F.

Wireless Communication Facility (WCF).

9-9-9: RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS:
A.

Intent - The intent of these standards is for temporary living quarters and not permanent or year-round
housing.

8.

Accessory Uses - Management headquarters, recreational facilities, toilets, dumping stations, coin-operated
laundry facilities, and other convenience establishments are permitted as accessory uses incidental to the
operation of the recreational vehicle park.

C.

Recreational vehicles shall be separated from each other and from other structures by at least ten ( I 0) feet.
Any accessory structures, such as attached awnings or carports, shall, for the purpose of this separation
requirement, be considered to be part of the recreational vehicle.

D.

Each recreational vehicle lot/space shall contain a stabilized vehicular parking pad composed of paving,
compacted crushed gravel, or other all-weather material.

E.

Interior drives in recreational vehicle parks which enter and exit onto a public road must be approved by the
applicable Highway District or the Idaho Transportation Department.

F.

Yards, fences, walls, or vegetative screening shall be provided at the property lines of a recreational vehicle
park where the park adjoins adjacent lands that are zoned or used for residential purposes. In particular,
extensive off-street parking areas and service areas for loading and unloading purposes other than for
passenger uses and areas for storage and collection of refuse shall be screened.

G.

Ifit is determined by the applicable Highway District or Idaho Transportation Department that traffic control
devices or other traffic regulation improvements are required as a result of development of a recreational
vehicle park, the Sponsor shall be responsible for the cost of installation or construction of said improvements.
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H.

Internal roads and parking service areas shall provide safe and convenient access for service and emergency
vehicles and to amenities within the recreational vehicle park. Internal roads shall not be designed to
encourage use by outside traffic to traverse the recreational vehicle park to adjoining developed areas.

I.

Each recreational vehicle lot shall have one (I) off-street vehicle parking space.

J.

Any action toward removal of wheels of a recreational vehicle, except for temporary purposes ofrepair or to
attach the recreational vehicle to the grounds for stabilizing purposes is prohibited.

K.

Occupancy ofa recreational vehicle park space by a particular recreational vehicle shall be limited each year
to only those days between Memorial Day and October 1, and/or a maximum of thirty (30) consecutive days
during the remaining months of the calendar year.

L.

A site plan shall be submitted upon application for a building permit with a No11h arrow and date of drawing,
showing uses and structures which are proposed. Said plan shall include adequate information to clearly depict
existing and proposed structures and their uses, existing and proposed roads, easements, points of access,
recreational vehicle lot dimensions, number of acres in site, dimensions of property lines, property line
setbacks, reserved or dedicated open space, major landscape features (both natural and man-made), locations
of existing and proposed utility lines, accessory off-street parking and loading facilities, parking space areas,
wastewater drainfield area, traffic circulation patterns, refuse and service areas, signs, outdoor storage, and
fences, yards, or wall or vegetative screening.

9-9-10: SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS:

I
I

iii

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

A.

Outdoor Lighting of Permitted Recreational Uses.

B.

Railroad car or truck cargo container/trailer used for storage or any other purpose not associated with the
active operation of a railroad or trucking business.

C.

As required by section 9-9-2 of this chapter.
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